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Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action
And Self-Help Repossession
By LAWRENCE A. ALEXANDER*
On November 11, 1974, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
the case of Adams v. Southern CaliforniaFirst National Bank" leaving
intact the Ninth Circuit's decision that self-help repossession, authorized
by section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter
U.C.C.), does not violate the Constitution.' The circuit court based its
decision on the finding that self-help repossession under section 9-503
does not involve state action. This article examines the no state action
position with regard to private repossession and concludes that state action is a spurious issue in this case and in every other legal controversy.
It then discusses the constitutional implications of the two most suspect
elements of private repossession-( 1) lack of prior hearing and (2)
use of private force-for the purpose of indicating how courts should
confront the real issues involved in repossession and analogous situations.
I.

State Action in Private Repossession

Most legal scholars who have written on the constitutionality of
private repossession have indicated that one of the principal issues to be
resolved is whether there is sufficient state action to bring the Fourteenth Amendment into play.' But the search for state action is a funda*

Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law

1. 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
2. 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973). Section 9-503 reads, in pertinent part: "Unless
otherwise agreed, a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed. . . without judicial process
• . . if this can be done without breach of the peace ...
3. For cases dealing with whether state action is involved in repossession under
U.C.C. § 9-503, see Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1974);
Gary v. Darnell, 505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 498
F.2d 365 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206
(5th Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. Mar.
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mentally misguided quest. State action is present in every lawsuit bequette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973); Watson v. Branch County Bank,
380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974); McDuffy v. Worthmore Furniture, Inc.,
380 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Va. 1974); Baker v. Keeble, 362 F. Supp. 355 (M.D. Ala.
1973); Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973);
Johnson v. Associates Fin., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. Ill. 1973); Kinch v. Chrysler
Credit Corp., 367 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Mayhugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet,
371 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1973), affd, 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1006 (1974); Shelton v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ga.
1973); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l
Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21
(N.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick v. First Nat'1 Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971);
John Deere Co. v. Catalano, 525 P.2d 1153 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1974); King v. South Jersey
Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 330 A.2d 1 (1974); Brown v. United States Nat'l Bank, 265
Ore. 234, 509 P.2d 442 (1973); Giglio v. Bank of Del., 307 A.2d 816 (Del. Ct. of Ch.
1973); Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1973);
Colvin v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 25 (D. Utah 1973); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 295 A.2d 402 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1972); Michel v. RexNoreco, Inc., 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 543 (D. Vt. 1972); Kipp v. Cozens, 11 UCC Rep.
Serv. 1067 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972).
For cases dealing with whether state action is involved in other self-help remedies,
see Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Natl Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1001 (1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Parks
v. "Mr. Ford," 386 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp.
491 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594
(E.D. Mich. 1974); Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 362 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mo. 1973),
aff'd, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1974); Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 346
F. Supp. 313 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973);
Dielen v. Levine, 344 F. Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1972); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp.,
338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Holt v. Brown, 336 F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Ky. 1971);
Kerrigan v. Boucher, 326 F. Supp. 647 (D. Conn.), aff'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d
487 (2d Cir. 1971); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Penn. 1970); Blye
v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170
(1973).
For law review articles discussing whether state action is involved in self-help remedies, see Brodsky, Constitutionality of Self-Help Repossession Under the Uniform Commercial Code: The Eighth and Ninth Circuits Speak, 19 S.D.L. REv. 295 (1974);
Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Pover and Creditors' Rights: An Essay
on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1973); Catz & Robinson, Due
Process and Creditor's Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to Mitchell, North
Georgia and Beyond, 28 RUT. L. REv. 541, 569-70, 572-84 (1975); Clark, Default,
Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the Underworld AND [sic] a
Proposed Salvation, 51 OREn. L. Ray. 302, 329 (1972); Clark & Landers, Sniadach,
Fuentes, and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355, 377-83
(1973); Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the Bill Collector, 15 ARiZ. L. Rav. 521,
552-54 (1973); Del Duca, Pre-Notice, Pre-Hearing,Pre-Judgment Seizure of AssetsSelf-Help Repossession Under UCC § 9-503, Its Antecedents and Future, 79 DICK. L.
REv. 211, 216 (1975); Hughes, Creditors' Self-Help Remedies Under UCC Section 9-503:
Violative of Due Process in Texas?, 5 ST. MARY's L. J. 701 (1974); Martin, Secured
Transactions, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 593 (1973); McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure and Substance-Repossession and Ad-
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cause the laws of a state are being applied. Indeed, as Shelley v.
hesion Contract Issues, 26 HAST. LJ. 383, 396-405 (1974); McDermott, The Supreme
Court's Changing Attitude Toward Consumer Rpotection (sic) and Its Impact on Montana Prejudgment Remedies, 36 MONT. L. REv. 165, 169-71 (1975); McDonnell, Sniadach, The Replevin Cases and Self-Help Repossession-Due Process Tokenism?, 14 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REv. 437 (1973); Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access
Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part II, 1974 DuY.r L. 527, 568-70; Neth,
Repossession of Consumer Goods: Due Process for the Consumer: What's Due for the
Creditor?, 24 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 7, 50-63 (1972); Spak, The Constitutionality of
Repossession By Secured Creditors under Article 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 10 HousT. L. REV. 855 (1973); Spak & Spak, Constitutional Attacks on Creditors' Sell-Help Repossession Rights Under U.C.C. Section 9-503-Developments in Illinois Secured Transactions, 24 DEPAuL L, REV. 378 (1975); White, The Abolition of
Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 503; Yudof, Reflections on Private Repossession, Public Policy and the Constitution, 122 U. PA. L. REv.
954, 962-63 (1974); Comment, Creditors' Prehearing Remedies and Due Process, 14
Am. L. REv. 834, 839-45 (1972); Note, ProceduralDue Process-Post-FuentesConstitutionality of Garagemen'sLiens, 54 B.U.L. REV. 542, 548-56 (1974); Comment, A Proposal for a Constitutional Innkeepers' Lien Statute, 24 BUFFALO L. REv. 369, 370-78
(1975); Comment, Self-Help Repossessions Under UCC Section 9-503--- 'State Action"?, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 389 (1973); Note, The Specter of State Action in SelfHelp Repossession, 5 CONN. L. REv. 294 (1972); Comment, Mortgages-DoesForeclosure Under Power of Sale Violate Due Process Rights?, 4 CuM.-SAm. L. REV. 507, 51519 (1974); Comment, 50 DENVER L.J. 261, 267-74 (1P73); Note, Self-Help Repossession: The Constitutional Attack, the Legislative Response, and the Economic Implications, 62 Gzo. LIJ. 273 (1973); Comment, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 635; Comment, State Action Considerationsand Economic Implications of Holding Self-Help Repossessions Unconstitutional, 1973 LAw AND Tm SocIA.L ORDER 707; Comment, State Action and
Waiver Implications of Self-Help Repossession, 25 ME. L REv. 27 (1973); Note,
Replevin and Non-Judicial Repossession in Light of Fuentes v. Shevin, 3 MEMPius ST. U.L. REV. 125, 132-35 (1972); Note, Security Interests: Self-Help Still
an Available.Method of Repossession, 28 U. MrAMI 'L. .REv. 231 (1973); Case Comment, 57 MINN. L, REV. 621 (1973); Note, Self-Help Repossession Under the Uniform Commercial Code: The Constitutionality of Article 9, Section 503, 4 N.M.L
REV. 75, 77-92 (1973); Note, The Growth of Procedural Due Process into a New
Substance: An Expanding Protection for Personal Liberty and a "Specialized Type
of Property . . . in Our Economic System," 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 502 (1971); Comment,
Adams v. Southern California First National Bank: 9-503 Constitutional-The End
of a Notable Beginning?, 35 U. PTTr. L REV. 882 (1974); Note, Summary Creditor Remedies: Going . . . Going . . . Gone?, 10 SAN DinGO L REV. 292 (1973);
Comment, Prejudgment Replevin and Self-Help Repossession-Creditor Remedies of
the Past: A Constiltutional Plan of Assault, 17 ST. Louis U.LJ. 127 (1972); Note,
Self-Help Repossession Under the U.C.C.: Presence or Absence of State Action?, 28
Sw. LJ. 796 (1974); Note, New York Creditor Remedies After Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant Co., 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 681 (1975); Comment, 24 SYRAcusE L. REV. 867
(1973); Case Comment, 6 TEx. TECH. U.L REV. 1135 (1975); Comment, Self-Help Repossession of Consumer Goods: A ConstitutionalLook at Section 9-503 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 7 VAL. L. REV. 439, 459-62 (1973); Comment, State Action and
the Constituitonality of UCC § 9-503, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 547 (1973); Note, Constitutional Torts: Section 1983 Redress for the Deprived Debtor, 14 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 627, 637 (1973).
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Kraemer' correctly suggested, 5 and as this article demonstrates,8 state
action is present wherever a relationship has legal consequences.
Although always present, state action may assume a variety of
forms, each carrying different constitutional implications. The four main
forms of state action are: (1) "proprietary action" where the state acts
through its agents; 7 (2) "mandatory action" where the state mandates
that individuals act in a certain way; (3) "permissive action" where the
state permits individuals to enjoy freedom of action by granting them an
enforceable right s to act or not to act; (4) "permissive action plus
special relation" where the state' permits private individuals the same

freedom as in (3) but additionally creates a special relationship with
them in connection with that freedom.9
a. Proprietary and Mandatory Actions

Proprietary action includes such practices as hiring state employees
4. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In Shelley, the Court struck down state court decisions
upholding the right of homeowners to invoke a restrictive covenant which prevented another owier from selling his property to blacks.
5. Although the Supreme Court in Shelley correctly identified court enforcement
of state law as state action, it did not see that all relationships are of legal consequence
and thus can be the subject of judicial enforcement. See text accompanying notes 1623 infra, and note 35 infra.
6. I do not want to imply that all commentators have overlooked the fact that
state action is always present, although in various forms. See Horowitz, The Misleading
Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REV. 208
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Horowitz]; Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN.
L REV. 3 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne & Karst]; Henkin, Shelley v.
Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. Rv. 473 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as Henkin]; Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAS L REv. 347 (1963);
Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in "Private" Housing, 52 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Horowitz, Racial Discriminiation];
Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State
Action, 1965 DUKE L.J 219 [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne]. See also Note, SelfHelp Repossession Under the Uniform Commercial Code: The Constitutionality of
Article 9, Section 503, 4 N.M.L. REv. 75, 77-92 (1973).
The position common to all of the above commentators and to this article is that
state action is present wherever a relationship has legal consequences. (See text accompanying notes 16-23, infra.) The only real question is not whether state action is present, but whether the state action which is present is constitutional. See Horowitz, supra,
at 209; Henkin, supra, at 481, 487-96.
7. See the discussion of the government's "enterprise capacity" in Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62-63 (1964).
8. I shall use "right" to refer to both rights and privileges in the Hohfeldian terminology. See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED TO JUDICIAL REASONING (1964). The distinction between Hohfeldian rights and privileges is
irrelevant to the subject of state action. See also note 16 infra.
9. See Horowitz, Racial Discrimination, supra note 6, at 17: "The total state action in these cases is the combination of state participation and involvement and state
law permitting the discrimination."
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or admitting students to state law schools. Mandatory action includes

such laws as those mandating safe driving or segregation of lunch
counters or laws prohibiting the sale of obscene materials. No court has
ever failed to find state action in either of these categories.
b. Permissive Action
The third form, permissive action, deserves extended attention
because it is the key to the difficulties which the state action concept has

engendered. Permissive action includes such laws as those that give
property owners the right to sell or lease property to whomever they
choose, 10 to enter into enforceable restrictive covenants," to ban leafletting or picketing on their property,' 2 and to restrict the use of their
property to whomever they choose.' 3 It also includes laws that give

individuals the right to enter into associations' 4 or to contract' 5 with
whomever they choose.
Permissive action exists against a backdrop of mandatory action.
For example, laws forbidding trespass, battery, theft, breach of contract,
and invasion of privacy represent mandatory actions restricting private
individuals and state officials and are the ones invoked to enforce the

rights and privileges granted by permissive actions.'( A society with only
10. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See discussion surrounding notes
17-22 infra.
11. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
12. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946).
13. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Bell v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 226 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
14. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
15. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226
(1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
16. It is irrelevant to my thesis whether something is a law itself or is only part
of a law (see Raz, Legal Principlesand the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972)),
or whether what appear to be exceptions to laws are only the result of having those laws
incompletely stated. Nor is it relevant whether permissive actions are really laws or
whether only their mandatory complements can claim that status. See text accompanying notes 21-23, 31 infra. Similarly, it is irrelevant whether laws which specify how
the powers over property are transferred or otherwise obtained are really laws or are
only parts of laws imposing primary obligations or directing the imposition of sanctions.
See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw, 35-38 (1961). Finally, it is irrelevant how my
permissive-mandatory classification of state actions squares with Hohfeld's categories.
See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED TO JUDICIAL REAsONING (1964). The issue of state action is unrelated to the jurisprudential positions mentioned above.
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mandatory actions and no permissive ones would be totalitarian in the
extreme, for there would be no room for individual choice. A society
with only permissive actions would be anarchical, for there would be no

restrictions of any sort on anyone.
Permissive actions, whether statutory or judicial in origin, 17 are just
as much acts of the state as are proprietary and mandatory actions, and
for that reason are just as much subject to the Fourteenth Amend-

ment.' 8 Even if one wished to deny that permissive actions were truly
acts of the state, it would make no difference. As has been pointed out,

except in a condition of anarchy, permissive state laws exist against a
backdrop of mandatory actions, and the latter clearly constitute state
action under any definition. Therefore, every case in which a permissive

action is challenged can be viewed as one in which the complementary
mandatory actions are challenged.' 9 The attack in Reitman v. Mulkey2"
on the permissive action granting landowners the right to discriminate in
the sale or leasing of their property could be viewed as a challenge to the

law against trespass, a mandatory action, for unconstitutional overbreadth. 2 '

Every case apparently involving a permissive action could in fact
be set up to involve complementary mandatory actions. For example,
the parties discriminated against in Reitman might have tendered rent
and entered the premises, forcing the landlord to sue them in trespass.

In fact, in Snyder v. Prendergrast,one of the cases included in Reitman,
17. There is no reason to deny common-law rules the status of state action subject
to the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, there is no reason why a common-law
rule cannot be unconstitutional. And it is clearly immaterial whether the common-law
rule is codified by legislative enactment or is solely judge-made. See Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948), and quote therefrom at note 32 infra. See also New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18. See Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 6, at 45-46; Winter, Poverty, Economic
Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. Cr. REv. 41. 45 [hereinafter cited
as Winter].
19. See Horowitz, Racial Discrimination,supra note 6, at 9-10; Van Alstyne, supra
note 6, at 239-40 n.42. Compare Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), with Black
v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
20. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
21. This ignores the fact to which the Court paid most attention in Reitman, viz.,
the attempted repeal of specific anti-discrimination laws. The Court, in dictum, approved the law of trespass as applied to protect racial discrimination by property owners.
In its holding, however, the Court found the repeal of the anti-discrimination laws to
be constitutionally defective, for reasons that no one has explained to my satisfaction.
See also Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantial Equal
Protection, 1967 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 39, 57.
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the landlord was seeking eviction of an interracial couple, who sued to

enjoin the eviction.22
Because there can be no permissive actions without complementary

mandatory ones, and because every constitutional challenge to permissive actions can be converted into a challenge to their mandatory
complements, there is no reason why permissive actions should not be
deemed state action.23

Although the existence of state action is under this analysis a false
issue even in the case of permissive actions, the reasonableness of state
action remains an issue. A proprietary action by the state or a mandatory action directing the same act by private individuals may be unconstitutional, but it does not necessarily follow that a permissive action giving
individuals an enforceable right to choose whether to do or not to do the
same thing will also be unconstitutional. The state may have legitimate

reasons for its permissive action which it does not have for its proprietary or mandatory action. The most prominent of these reasons is simply
allowing individual freedom of choice.
The general state interest in allowing individual freedom of choice

can be subdivided into at least three distinct interests: (1) promotion of
certain values such as privacy, autonomy, association, and protection of
sensibilities, or economic gain, which individuals have but states do
not;2 4 (2) fairness to individuals who have acquired property by allow-

ing them to dispose of it as they choose even if no positive values other
22. Again I am assuming that the anti-discrimination laws are completely out of
the picture.
23. It should be emphasized, perhaps, that the view of state action expressed in
this article does not lead to the conclusion that individuals not acting as agents of the
state can violate the Fourteenth Amendment. It is still the state and its agents who
violate the Constitution by enforcing permissive actions and not the individual who has
the permission. In other words, there is a difference between the permissive action and
the permitted action. See the discussion of federal action under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in Van Alstyne and Karst, supra note 6. See also Horowitz,
Racial Discrimination, supra note 6, at 22, 38-39. But see Hill v. Toll, 320 F.
Supp. 185, 187-88 (E.D. Pa. 1970); DeCarlo v. Joseph Home & Co., 251 F. Supp.
935 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
It should also be emphasized that in some cases it will not be easy to determine
whether the state is prohibiting an activity or permitting it. For example, mandatory
action laws against an activity may not include criminal sanctions, and the civil remedies
(damages, injunction) may be insufficient or non-existent. In such a case the state
should be deemed to be permitting the activity, especially if it also prohibits the victim's
self-help interference with those engaged in the activity.
24. See Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal
Protection, 1967 Sup. Cr. Rav. 39. Karst and Horowitz concentrate exclusively on this
state interest.
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than autonomy are promoted; (3) exemption of an area of life from

state regulation, thereby reducing costs in terms of money, time, and
governmental intrusion into private affairs. 25
Determination of the constitutionality of permissive actions requires balancing these various state interests against the effects of allowing certain choices to be made by individuals. These effects increase in
scope and severity if the individuals making the choices have large or

strategic property holdings, or if many individuals act in concert or at
least in a similar manner. 28
One must examine the totality of laws and their impact to gauge
the effect of allowing private choice in a particular area. For example,
one must ask under what rules and with what results is property
distributed. Has the state -provided public services on a nondiscriminatory basis for those who are excluded by private discrimination? Deter-

mination of the constitutionality of a particular law in terms of equal
protection or due process is usually in reality an assessment of the
constitutionality of the entire system of laws as applied in a particular
case (although some laws may be unconstitutional no matter against
what backdrop of other laws they appear). But one need not conclude
that only one system of distribution of property rights passes consti27
tutional muster.
25. In assessing these state interests one should ask whether the private individual
is exercising choice with respect to the disposition of property given to him by the state.
If he is, then fairness to him is not a state interest, unless the property is believed to
be his by entitlement and not really within the state's discretion to give. Welfare in
its various forms is treated constitutionally like an entitlement once it is provided, although the state is apparently not constitutionally required to proxide it at all. Thus,
welfare, unlike aid given individuals or organizations to carry out governmental functions on behalf of the taxpayers, is generally felt to be the recipient's property to
use with no more restrictions than if it had been acquired by the recipient himself in
another manner. The state has more legitimate reasons for allowing the welfare recipient to use the property in ways constitutionally prohibited to it than it does for allowing
those performing governmental functions with taxpayers' funds to do so. But the state
does have some legitimate reasons (e.g., efficiency) for allowing even those performing
governmental functions to use the funds in ways prohibited to it. See notes 49-55 infra.
26. Henkin, supra note 6, at 487-96; Van Alstyne & Karst. supra note 6, at 78; Horowitz, Racial Discrimination, supra note 6, at 7, take the same general view
about what factors should be weighed in determining the constitutionality of permissive
actions. See also Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLuM. L. REV. 1083, 1118,
1120 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Lewis].
27. See generally Winter, supra note 18.
It should be safe to say that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment at its most general level is a requirement of government impartiality towards all
citizens except those who because of their acts deserve rewards or punishment. Thus,
equal protection demands that a discrimination which burdens one group more than another be justified by some rational connection with a legitimate governmental purpose,
i.e., a purpose that benefits even the least advantaged of groups affected by the discrimi-
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One reason why permissive actions have created a dilemma for
courts and commentators is that the state action involved on its face
treats everyone equally, while, at the same time, it allows individual

action which discriminates. Thus, the permissive actions struck down in
Shelley v. Kraemer2s and Reitman v. Mulkey 29 gave all property owners
the right to covenant restrictively and to sell or lease their property to
whomever they chose. These cases created problems, not because the

state was not acting, but because the state was not discriminating in its
actions, even though the private individuals who invoked the laws were
discriminating. The Supreme Court confused the issue by writing as if

the states' actions had been to discriminate racially. The Court, therefore, failed to analyze the real actions of the states to determine whether
those actions, impartial and non-oppressive on their face, were in operation unfair or oppressive to certain persons or groups, and whether the

value of freedom of choice was sufficient in the context of real estate
transactions to justify the states' protection of it despite any adverse
effects. By the same analysis, the right of company towns or shopping

centers to invoke trespass laws to squelch speech could be considered
oppressive and unfair, even though the right of landowners to invoke the

trespass laws is in general fair and non-oppressive.80
nation. See also the description of the maximin principle in J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF
JusnTcn 152-57 (1971).
The due process clause functions, in its substantive mode, as an injunction against
excessive infringement of the rights of citizens and, in its procedural mode, as an injunction against adjudications made without adequate procedural safeguards.
One might decide that any set of laws is constitutional within a given range. At
one end of the range would be a set of laws exemplifying egalitarian principles like those
of Rawls. See RIwLs id. At the other end would be a set with an initially fair distribution of rights and resources, but one that allows inequalities to occur as a result of luok
in the distribution of talents, friendships, loved ones, etc. See R. NozicK, ANARcHY,
STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
Any legislative choice would be constitutional so long as it
represented an impartial and non-oppressive position between strict egalitarianism and
libertarianism.
Van Alstyne and Karst, supra note 6, seem to believe that private racial discrimination in certain sectors should be upheld as constitutional only if the state is itself redistributing wealth in the form of education, housing, welfare, etc., on a nonracial basis.
This apparently commits them to mandating, as a constitutional matter, a position somewhere beyond libertarianism. But they do not require strict egalitarianism; for they
seem unconcerned as a constitutional matter with inequalities in the private sector
brought about by discrimination against the untalented, the ugly, etc. See Nagel, Equal
Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination, 2 PHILos. & PuB. Am. ms 348 (1973);
Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through
the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (-1969).
28. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
29. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
30. See cases cited at note 12 supra, and Horowitz, supra note 6, at 217-19.
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One further example should suffice to make the point that the
reasonableness,not the existence, of state action is the issue in every case

involving permissive actions. Suppose a state law allowed whites but not
blacks to discriminate racially in the sale or leasing of real property. It is
unlikely that any court or commentator would deny that this permissive
action for the benefit of whites constituted state action. The case, of

course, might come to the courts as an attack on a mandatory action,
either by persons discriminated against by whites, or by blacks who had
attempted to discriminate themselves. However, as previously pointed

out, every attack on a permissive action can be viewed as an attack on a
mandatory action instead. The only difference between the permissive
action just described and those in Shelley, Reitman, et al, is that the
hypothetical is racially discriminatory on its face, while the latter were
not.31
Shelley is the source of much of the confusion on state action. In
Shelley the state action was to allow individuals the freedom to enter

into enforceable racially restrictive covenants-a permissive action, the
mandatory complement to which was the law mandating that covenants
be kept. The Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment to the enforcement of the private decision to discriminate racially in the same way it
would apply it to mandatory or proprietary action by the state effecting
the state's own decision to discriminate racially. The Court concluded

that because the latter actions would be unconstitutional, so was the
32

former.

31. For an example of a law similar to the one above, see Horowitz, supra note
6, at 210-11.
32. "The enforcement of the restrictive agreements by the state courts in these
cases was directed pursuant to the common-law policy of the States as formulated by
those courts in earlier decisions ....
The judicial action in each case bears the clear
and unmistakable imprimatur of the State. We have noted that previous decisions of
this Court have established the proposition that judicial action is not immunized from
the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment simply because it is taken pursuant to the
state's common-law policy. Nor is the Amendment ineffective simply because the particular pattern of discrimination, which the State has enforced, was defined initially by
the terms of a private agreement. State action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all forms.
.. . We have noted that freedom from discrimination by the States in the enjoyment of property rights was among the basic objectives sought to be effectuated by the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. That such discrimination has occurred in these
cases is clear. . . ." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948).
A mandatory action effecting the same racially discriminatory result as the permissive action in Shelley might be a law compelling all property owners in particular neighborhoods to sell only to members of certain races regardless of whether they had covenanted to do so-i.e., a racial zoning law. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
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Although Shelley was correct in treating the action in question as
state action, it was wrong in assuming that state enforcement of a private
decision could be no more reasonable than state enforcement of the
state's own decisions effecting the same result. If Shelley were followed
consistently on the latter point, all private action which the state could
not constitutionally undertake itself or compel through mandatory actions would be unconstitutional. For example, a state could not, through
a proprietary or mandatory action, give monetary aid to a particular

church or to the Ku Klux Klan, or through a proprietary action invite
only whites onto its property. The logic of Shelley would not permit
private individuals to do so either if the state were called upon to enforce

their choice. It is widely accepted that the Fourteenth Amendment was
not intended to deny to individuals enforcement of all choices denied the
states.33 It is also widely accepted that the Fourteenth Amendment

actually compels enforcement of some individual choices denied the
states, such as giving one's money to a particular religion or political
party. 34 For these reasons the logic of Shelley has not been followed. 35
(1917). A proprietary action effecting the same result might be the state's leasing its
property only to members of a particular race, or entering into restrictive covenants with
adjoining land owners.
However, the mandatory actions (complements of the permissive action) actually
involved in Shelley were "keep your covenants" and "do not trespass," not "only whites
can live here" (i.e., racial zoning).
33. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 29 (1959).
34. In some contexts the individual has a constitutional right to choose his associates and select those whom he wishes to benefit with his property on almost any basis
that he desires. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 107 U.S. 163 (1972). See also, Sengstock & Sengstock, Discrimination: A ConstitutionalDilemma, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv.
59 (1967); Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus
Freedom from Discrimination, 84 YALE LJ. 1441 (1975); Comment, Jones v. 'Alfred
H. Mayer Co. Extended to Private Education: Gonzalez v. Fairfax-Brewster School,
Inc., 122 U. PA. L. Rnv. 471 (1973). The interesting question is how large is the area
between the point at which the state is constitutionally forbidden to allow private discrimination and the point at which the state is constitutionally compelled to allow private discrimination. Assuming that Shelley, Reitman, Marsh, Logan Valley, et al., are
correct and that some laws permitting private discrimination are constitutionally unreasonable, can the state ever reasonably permit private discrimination which it is not constitutionally compelled to permit? (On the question of whether there is a middle ground
in which the state is constitutionally free to allow or outlaw discrimination, see Henkin,
supra note 6, at 487-96 and 503, especially 495 n.47. See also Van Alstyne & Karst,
Comment: Sit-Ins and State Action-Mr. Justice Douglas, Concurring, 14 STAN. L. REV.
762 (1962). One reason there might be such a middle ground is that the costs of preventing discrimination might justify the state's refusal to prevent it. The state might
determine the desirability of incurring those costs without having to commit itself to either position. Another reason might be that such a middle ground represents an impar-
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Today, a finding that permissive state action is unconstitutional
requires more than the conclusion that a proprietary or mandatory
tial, non-oppressive position between egalitarianism and libertarianism. See note 27
supra.
35. See, e.g., Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166, 1170 (5th Cir.
1975).
Some commentators have sought to limit the implications of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), for permissive actions by arguing that what was crucial in the
case was that the state courts were forcing discrimination by one unwilling to discriminate. See Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959). I believe such an analysis of Shelley is untenable for several reasons:
(1) The states were not forcing anyone who had paid consideration for the legal
right to sell to blacks to discriminate against them. It is one thing to say that for constitutional reasons no one can withhold the rights associated with a fee interest in realty.
It is quite another thing to say that where there is a restrictive covenant, no such legal
right was withheld. Moreover, if Shelley were limited only to covenantors seeking relief
from the terms of the covenant, it would not apply to reverters, rights of re-entry, powers of approval, etc., which would effect the same result in substance regardless of the
desire of the seller to sell to a black. On the other hand, if Shellty did apply to these
devices, it is even clearer that it is only a constitutional conclusion that the seller had
ever acquired any right to transfer his property to blacks. (Henkin points out that the
unwilling seller in Shelley was not himself being treated unequally; his claim would have
to be in the nature of due process. Henkin also points out the unsympathetic nature
of the seller. Henkin, supra note 6, at 478 n.10.) See also Horowitz, supra note 6,
at 214.
(2) It seems unlikely that if the Supreme Court thought it rcasonable for a state
to allow private persons to discriminate in the sale of property, it would prevent the state
from enforcing a contract to discriminate between the owner of property and his agent,
even though the agent might decide he dislikes discriminating. Thus, if one owns a shoe
store and desires to sell shoes only to whites, and nothing in the state law or the Constitution prevents such discrimination, the Court would undoubtedly allow the state to
enforce a provision in a contract between the store owner and an employee which requires the latter to sell only to whites.
(3) Taken together, (1) and (2) suggest that it is no more unreasonable for the
state to enforce covenants to discriminate than it is for the state to enforce one-party
discrimination; or, at least, if it is more unreasonable, it is not because one party decides,
after covenanting, that he does not wish to discriminate.
Other attempts to narrow Shelley also appear untenable:
(1) The fact that Shelley involved a restraint on alienation is irrelevant without
more. Restraints on alienation are disfavored, if at all, as a matter of state public policy; and a state might decide that it does not object to such restraints.
(2) The fact that the covenant in Shelley could not be enforced by self-help but
required court enforcement is also irrelevant. Surely it would not have made the state
action more reasonable to have allowed the aggrieved co-covenantors the right to use
self-help to prevent the black purchaser from occupying the land. Moreover, as I have
pointed out before, even where self-help is allowed under state law, the state's judicial
and enforcement machinery will stand ready to intervene at the behest of one party or
the other and will in fact intervene if necessary to keep the peace. The owner of property may have the right under state law to use self-help to prevent a trespass. However,
such a right to self-help does not indicate a condition of anarchy. Although the owner
or rightful possessor has the right to use self-help, the trespasser does not. If the owner
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action effecting the same result would be unconstitutional. The private
action permitted usually must be deemed the performance of a "public

function,"3 6 or it must involve property that the private person has
opened to the public.17 However, courts and commentators have not
or possessor forgoes his privilege to commit battery, and instead calls the police or sues,
it seems unreasonable to deem this state aid unconstitutional while at the same time
deeming constitutional the state's granting the privilege to commit battery to only one
party. For the same position with respect to the irrelevance of the judicial enforcement
versus self-help distinction, see Lewis, supra note 26, at 1097 n.52; Van Alstyne & Karst,
supra note 6, at 37; Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 236-37; and Comment, State Action:
Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 656, 678-79 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment, State Action].
Finally, the holding in Shelley that it was unconstitutional for the state to enforce
racially restrictive covenants, but not unconstitutional for the state to allow unenforceable restrictive covenants, does not mean there is some area in which there are permissive actions without mandatory counterparts (i.e., no state action). The permission to
engage in unenforceable, racially restrictive covenants, left intact by the Supreme Court,
has several mandatory counterparts. The landowner could enter into a restrictive covenant and adhere voluntarily to it~without thereby losing his right to invoke the laws of
trespass, battery, etc., against those whom the covenant excluded. See Lewis, supra note
26, at 1121-22 n.134, and Horowiti, RacialDiscrimination,supranote 6, at 27.
36. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the law of trespass (or its complement, the permission to landowners to exclude from their property whomever and whatever activities they choose) was held, in effect, unconstitutional as applied to protect a
private corporation performing a "public function" from unwanted leafletting on its
property, where had the state itself been performing the function it could not have constitutionally invoked the law. The "public function" approach is hopelessly vague in
scope and rationale. It suggests either some static concept of governmental functions or
the possibility that whatever is done by government must be done subject to the same
restrictions when done privately, even though the private person may have purposes and
interests without analogs on the governmental level. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296 (1966). See also note 37 infra.
In Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), the public function theory was perverted
by what was undoubtedly both a futile and unconstitutional Supreme Court attempt to
prohibit racial bloc voting. The major basis of the decision was that the racial bloc
was performing the governmental function of selecting candidates for office. But if
there is any function in a democracy that is not governmental, it is deciding whom to
support for office, even within the context of a bloc arrangement. To analyze Terry
in terms of permissive actions, it was not only constitutional for Texas to permit private
racial voting blocs, but it would have been unconstitutional not to permit them. For
a contrary view of Terry v. Adams, see Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 6, at 26.
They would outlaw even religious parties which were successful.
37. In Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968), the law of trespass (or its permissive complement) was held, in effect,
unconstitutional as applied to protect a privately owned shopping center, open to the
public, from undesired picketing, where the state itself could not have invoked the law
had it owned the shopping center and opened it to the public. Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). The "open to the public" approach is more comprehensible
than the "public function" approach, especially when applied to a large private holding.
The private owner has less significant privacy or associational interests to protect, and
allowing him absolute control over his property would have a great effect on those whom
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approached the issue in terms of the reasonableness of the permissive

state action, that is, the reasonableness of allowing and enforcing certain
private choices. Instead they have considered only the private choice and
its results and noted from time to time that the state is implicated in the

action. Therefore, no consistent approach to permissive state action has
developed. More often than not, courts and commentators have been

preoccupied with whether the state action is "sufficient"' rather than with
38
whether it is unreasonable.
he excludes. See Henkin, supra note 6, at 499; Horowitz, Racial Discrimination,supra
note 6, at 9; and Comment, State Action, supra note 35, at 697.
(Perhaps a legitimate use of the "p'ublic function" concept can be found in the area
of free speech on premises "open to the public." Thus, we might say that the government has an obligation to provide speakers with access to the public in areas where the
invasion of privacy or economic interests of others is minimal. The government therefore cannot allow a private shopping center [by invocation of state trespass laws] to
deny speakers access to shoppers where the center itself has no privacy or economic interests affected [but what about the center's speech interests?], and where the government, were it the owner of the center, could not prevent the speech, either in the interests of the shoppers or the shops. The "public function," therefore, would be that of
providing places suitable for access to the public. This concept of "public function" is
significant not only because governments do provide such access to the public [e.g., by
providing sidewalks, parks, etc.], but because governments are constitutionally compelled to do so, even where it means a "constitutional easement" for speech over private
property with certain characteristics. In other words, "public function" is not a description of the activity of a private owner from which a constitutional conclusion follows,
but a statement of the constitutional conclusion itself.)
38. See, e.g., the following quote from the circuit court's opinion in Adams
v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1006 (1974): 'The test is not state involvement, but rather is significant
state involvement. Statutes and laws regulate many forms of purely private activity,
such as contractual relations and gifts, and subjecting all behavior that conforms to state
law to the Fourteenth Amendment would emasculate the state action concept." 492
F.2d at 330-31.
The confusion of sufficiency with reasonableness of state action is commented upon
by Horowitz, supra note 6, at 208-9, and Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 246. Of course,
none of the authors mentioned in note 6 are guilty of.this confusion, but they are exceptional.
One area where there has been considerable confusion regarding state action has
been that of de facto segregation of public schools. Here, however, the problem has
not been one of comparing a permissive state action with a mandatory or proprietary
one effecting similar results, but instead has been one of comparing one mandatory action--"attend a racially designated school"-with another mandatory action-"attend
the school in your neighborhood." The two mandatory actions may produce similar results in areas where the neighborhoods are racially homogeneous, but they have different
purposes. Also, the neighborhood school law will produce a non-segregated school system whenever neighborhoods cease to be segregated. In other words, the correspondence
of effect of the neighborhood school law with the racial school law is fortuitous and
time-bound. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). But again, both laws are mandatory state actions, and the segregation resulting from the neighborhood school law is
clearly the product of state action. Therefore, it is unnecessary to search for secret seg-
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Permissive Action Plus Special Relation

Permissive state action, where there is also a relationship with the
private person in connection with the permitted choices beyond their
mere allowance and enforcement, presents, perhaps, the toughest problems. Examples of this type of state action are granting to the private

actor monopoly status,39 monetary subsidies, 40 tax exemptions, 4 emregative intent on the part of school boards in order to attribute de facto segregation to
the state. It is misleading to do so, especially when the remedy upon finding such an
intent is to integrate the entire district rather than to restore neighborhood schools. See
Fiss, School Desegregation.: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PluLos. & PuB. AFFAms
3 (1974).
39. Compare Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), with
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). The receipt of an ordinary license,
such as a building permit, health permit, etc., should not be considered as establishing
a special relationship with the state as long as it does not grant a monopolistic or quasimonopolistic status. Although in many cases the state would not be constitutionally
compelled to grant the license without imposing certain restrictions upon the recipient,
the issuance of an unrestricted license should be treated like any other permissive action
which does not create a special relationship between the state and the recipient. Constitutionally it should make no difference that the state sends a certificate along with its
grant of permission. See Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 6; Horowitz, Racial Discrimination, supra note 6, at 15-16; Comment, supra note 35, at 685-90. Where there
are a limited number of licenses, however, granting of the license without imposition
of constitutionally allowable restrictions is more than a mere permission. See Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See also Palmer v. Columbia Gas,
Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973); Ihrke v. Northern States Power
Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972); Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1972); Martin v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 441 F.2d 1116
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971); Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental
Soe'y, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp.
443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Hattell v. Public Serv. Co., 350 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1972);
Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972); Horowitz, Racial Discrimination, supranote 6, at 7.
40. See Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U.S. 455 (1973). Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672 (1971); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sloan
v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472
(1973). See also Keller v. Kate Maremount Fdn., 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974); Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974); Jackson
v. Norton-Children's Hosp., Inc., 487 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
1000 (1974); Doe v. Bellin Mem. Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973); Grafton v.
Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Weigand v. Afton View Apts.,
473 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1973); Male v. Crossroads Associates, 469 F.2d 616 (2nd Cir.
1972); McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971); McGuane v. Chenango
Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); Hahn
v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970); Arrington v. City of Fairfield, 414 F.2d
687 (5th Cir. 1969); Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir.
1969); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2nd Cir. 1968); Meredith v. Allen County War
Mem. Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968); Cypress v. Newport News Gen.
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ployment,42 or lessee or vendee status, 3 combined with allowing certain
and Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710
(4th Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F.
Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); McClellan v. University Heights, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 374 (D.R.L
1972); Guillory v. Administrators of the Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La.
1962); Bonner v. Park Lake Housing Dev. Fund Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 325, 333 N.Y.S.2d
277 (Sup. Ct. 1972). Compare the government funds in these cases with welfare paid
to individuals.
41. See Jackson v. Statler Fdn., 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 927 (1975); Weigand v. Afton View Apts., 473 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1973); Browns
v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350
F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973); McGlotten v.
Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F.
Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971),
aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Guillory v. Administrators of the
Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962); Horowitz, Racial Discrimination,
supra note 6, at 16; Comment, Tax Incentives as State Action, 122 U. PA. L. Rv. 414
(1973). But see Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Chicago Joint Bd.,
Amal. Cloth. Wkrs. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970); Bright v.
Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), affd, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971);
Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972).
42. Of course, if one is an agent of the state he is bound by those restrictions imposed on states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The state acts only through agents.
However, should those who independently contract with the state be treated as though
they were state agents for purposes of deciding whether the state must require them to
act as it would be required to act? Or can a constitutional difference rest on the distinction between an agent and an independent contractor? See notes 45, 46 infra. See also
cases cited at note 40 supra, and Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th
Cir. 1962).
43. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). The Supreme Court held that a private lessee in a state-owned building could not be allowed
by the state to discriminate racially in selecting customers. The Court failed to mention whether the lessee would have to base its hiring of employees, as well as its selection of customers, solely on criteria available to the state in its proprietary capacity. For
example, could the owner of the restaurant hire his brother-in-law as chef, even though
his brother-in-law was objectively less qualified than other applicants when measured by
criteria constitutionally permitted a state personnel officer hiring chefs for state-run restaurants? The Court also failed to discuss adequately whether the state was maximizing
revenue from the lease because the lessee, if forced to cease discrimination, would not
have taken the lease. See Lewis, supra note 26, at 1100-2. See also Muir v. Louisville
Park Theatrical Ass'n., 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d
1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Male v. Crossroads Associates, 469 F.2d 616 (2nd Cir. 1972);
McNeal v. Tate County School Dist., 460 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1972); McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971); Wimbish v. Pinellas County, Fla., 342 F.2d 804 (5th
Cir. 1965); Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964);
Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962); City of Greensboro
v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957); Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957); Department of Conservation & Develop-
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private actions which could not be constitutionally mandated or undertaken by the state itself. It may not be unreasonable for the state to allow
private individuals to discriminate in providing services-but what if the

state has also granted an individual a monopoly position with respect to
provision of those services? 44 It may not be unreasonable for the state to
allow a private school to admit only Catholics-but what if the school is
receiving state aid? 45 It may not be unreasonable for the state to allow
an employer to discriminate racially in hiring employees-but what if

the state has entered into a contract with him, or leased its property to
him?4 6 These questions are extraordinarily difficult to answer, especially

when the state is pursuing, through permissive action plus a special relation, a legitimate goal that it could have pursued through a proprietary
or mandatory type of action, but only with certain constraints, such as
47
no racial discrimination.
ment v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956); Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n., 296
F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp.
649 (E.D. La. 1961).
44. Conceivably there may be leigitimate reasons for the state to grant a monopoly
status to a private person or firm that desires to discriminate in ways not permitted the
state itself. Those reasons, however, would have to benefit those disadvantaged by the
discrimination sufficiently to outweigh that disadvantage. See the discussion of the
"maximin principle" in J. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 152-57 (1971).
45. The state may save money by supporting private schools directly, or indirectly
through tax credits or vouchers for fixed amounts less than the per student cost in the
public schools. This support enables private schools to remain open and saves the taxpayers part of the cost of educating their pupils, without losing any redistributive effect
in the financing of the public schools themselves. Or the state may consider money
spent for education to be like welfare, spendable by the recipient with no strings attached
as long as it is spent on specified items. Thus, as a welfare recipient can take a welfare
check into the supermarket and discriminate among brands of tomatoes on grounds that
the state could not use when purchasing tomatoes, so, it might be argued, should a pupil
be able to spend his share of education money at any accredited institution, whether discriminatory or not. See Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 6, at 7, 50, for similar examples (e.g., public housing tenants subletting only to whites). See also Lewis, supra
note 26, at 1103; Horowitz, RacialDiscrimination,supranote 6, at 13, 15.
46. The independent contractor who discriminates in hiring on grounds not available to the state may be more efficient than competing contractors or the state's own
employees. One reason for his greater efficiency may be that his employees have long
experience as a team. Another reason may be that integrated contractors have morale
problems. It is generally assumed that a state cannot refuse to hire persons solely because the prejudices of its other employees would result in a decline of morale. (It is
unclear to what extent the prejudices of the public can be considered in hiring state employees-for example, to what extent such prejudices can justify hiring black policemen
for black neighborhoods.) Ironically, if the state did not contract with the lowest bidder
because he had discriminatory hiring policies, then the state would be spending extra
money to see that persons in a particular group obtained jobs on state projects, something it perhaps could not do directly.
47. See, e.g., notes 44-46 supra.
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d. A Comparison: Sufficiency versus Reasonableness of State Action
The recent case of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company4 s is
an excellent vehicle for comparing the approach to state action presented here with the traditional search for "sufficient" state action. In
Jackson a customer of a privately-owned public utility had her service
discontinued without notice and hearing for nonpayment of bills. She
claimed a denial of due process. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, looked at the heavy state regulation of the company, its alleged
monopoly status, the "public function' it performed, and the state authorization of its actions, and concluded:
[The State of Pennsylvania is not sufficiently connected with
respondent's action in terminating petitioner's service so as to make
respondent's conduct in so doing attributable to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. We therefore have no occasion to decide whether petitioner's claim to continued service was
"property" for purposes of that Amendment, or whether "due
process of law" would require a State taking similar action49to accord petitioner the procedural rights for which she contends.
According to the thesis of this article there was, of course, no state
action issue in Jackson. The Court should have asked whether it would
be constitutional for a state to permit a utility company with a stategranted monopoly status absolute discretion with respect to whom it
would provide service. If the answer were "yes," the Court would have
needed to go no further, for clearly a hearing would be of no benefit in
the absence of some possible substantive right.5 0
If the answer were "no," 51 the Court then should have asked
whether the state could permit a utility company with a state-granted
monopoly status to refuse service to persons who did not pay their bills.
If the answer to this question were "no," then the Court would have to
ascertain whether the company did in fact have a monopoly status and,
if so, whether it was state-granted. However, the Court undoubtedly
48. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
49. Id. at 358-59.
50. Cf. Note, Procedural Due Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86
H. v. L. REV. 880, 905-6 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Housing].
51. The answer should have been "no" because it is unlikely that even a saving
of the taxpayers' money (in the decision to provide utility service through privatelyowned rather than state-owned companies) could justify a state's permitting the privately-owned companies freedom to choose their customers while also granting them protection from competition. The least advantaged persons, those denied service by the
companies, would not be better off than they would be with state-provided service and
a higher tax bill. See note 44 supra. See also Note, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process in Terminations of Utility Services for Nonpayment, 86 HAv. L. REv. 1477, 148891 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Terminations].
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would have answered "yes." Even a state-owned utility probably could

constitutionally withhold service for nonpayment of bills. But even if a
state-owned utility could not, surely a privately-owned utility could.
If a privately-owned utility company could refuse service to those
who did not pay their bills, but could not refuse service at its whim, the
final question would be whether a state could allow such a company to
terminate service for nonpayment without notice and hearing. Contrary
to what is usually the case, this permissive state action (or, if there were

a state-granted monopoly, permissive state action plus special relationship) would not seem any more reasonable than would the comparable

proprietary state action, that is, pre-hearing terminations by a stateowned utility. The private company's interest, saving money, would be
the same interest the state would have in its proprietary action. The only
difference between the two might lie in the state's greater ability to spread
its losses through taxation. 52 However, -this difference would not seem
sufficient to justify a different outcome. Therefore, the final question
could be changed to whether a state-owned utility could terminate
service for nonpayment of bills without notice and a hearing. That
question, never reached by the Supreme Court in Jackson, almost
certainly would have been reached following the approach of this arti53
cle.
Reading through the majority opinion in Jackson one gets a strong
sense of the emptiness of the traditional "search" for state action,5 4
an emptiness which gives rise to such verbal evasions as "sifting facts

and weighing circumstances." 55 The sources of this emptiness are: (1)
52. The losses I am referring to here are the losses due to delay in shutting off
service to non-paying customers. If the required hearing is to be provided by the private
utility company at its expense, rather than by the state through its judicial or administrative machinery, there might appear more reason to distinguish private from stateowned public utilities with respect to the duty to hold a pre-termination hearing. However, this would not be the case. If the state has a constitutional duty to hold pre-termination hearings where it owns the utility, it cannot avoid that duty in the context of
privately-owned utilities by requiring the privately-owned utilities to hold the hearings
themselves and refusing to pay the expenses of the required hearings. Cf. Note, Housing, supra note 50, at 893, 900, 908-10 (discussing hearings in privately-owned, publiclysubsidized housing projects).
53. See Part II infra, for a discussion of the considerations in determining at what
point a person has a right to a hearing. For a discussion of the right to a hearing in
the context of utility service terminations, see Comment, Constitutional Restrictions on
Termination of Services by Privately Owned Public Utilities, 39 Mo. L. REv. 205
(1974); Note, Terminations,supra note 51, at 1488-91.
54. For a good example of the traditional empty search, see the majority opinion
in Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
55. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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not knowing the object of the search; (2) having the object of the search,
that is, state action, already present; and (3) not examining what really
should be examined, namely, -the reasonableness of the state action.

The traditional approach to state action resulted in avoiding the
important question in Jackson. The same approach in the area of self-

help repossession is likely to result in the Supreme Court's missing the
true question when and if it fully considers self-help repossession.56 For
just as in the case of termination of utility services without notice or
hearing, in the area of repossession laws the usual rule probably does
not hold, namely, that permissive actions (or permissive-plus-special-

relationship state actions) may not be unconstitutional, even though a
proprietary or mandatory state action implementing a similar decision
by the state would be. In the first place, there is no reason (again, other

than a deeper pocket) the state might have for allowing private repossession that it would not also have for allowing itself to effect a prehearing repossession whenever it is a creditor. 7 The state as landowner
lacks many of the interests such as privacy, aesthetics and association
which the private landowners wished to protect in Shelley; but the state
as creditor has precisely the same interests in repossession that a private

creditor has.5 8
Moreover, the germane comparison for this analysis is not between
private, self-help repossession and repossession by the state as creditor,

but is between private, self-help repossession and private, state-assisted
56. Of course, by denying certiorari in Adams the Court let stand the questionmissing approach.
57. There might be more reason to distinguish between state and private repossessions and to find the private more reasonable if state officials received greater insulation
from liability for wrongful repossession than private creditors. Dunham, Due Process
and Commercial Law, 1972 Sup. Cr. REv. 135, 150-52.
58. But compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (striking down replevin
statutes allowing pre-hearing seizure), with Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589
(1931) (allowing pre-hearing assessment of tax liability).
The identity of state and private interests can also be found in other acts of the
state as creditor, such as pre-hearing attachment, garnishment, etc. (see North Ga.
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975)) and Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)), as well as in many other acts of the state in its various
enterprise capacities (e.g., pre-hearing expulsion of students from public schools for the
same reasons private schools would have [see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)],
and firing employees for reasons a private employer would also have [see Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)]).
Where the state lacks reasons for pre-hearing action that a private person in an
analogous position might have, then, of course, it would not automatically follow that
the unconstitutionality of state pre-hearing action means the unconstitutionality of private pre-hearing action.
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repossession. What is significant is that the courts have never had difficulty finding state action in the latter. If lack of a prior hearing is a
constitutional infirmity in state-assisted repossession, then it is also
a constitutional infirmity in comparable self-help repossession.

The

state has no reason for dispensing with a prior hearing when it allows
the creditor to use self-help repossession that it does not have for
dispensing with a prior hearing when it assists him. Indeed, because
repossession by state agents instead of private creditors reduces the
chances of violence and unnecessary intrusion, there is a stronger basis
for holding permissive state actions which allow purely private repossession unconstitutional than for holding state-assisted repossessions unconstitutional. Those courts and commentators who have anguished
over whether the lack of state assistance in private repossessions allows
such repossessions to escape Fourteenth Amendment restrictions have
gone in the wrong direction. They have failed to see that a permissive
type of state action is as much state action as other types, and in the case
of repossession, unlike the usual case, less likely to be reasonable than
the comparable other types. In the area of self-help repossession, state
action is a bogus issue, at least insofar as its absence is seen as a reason
for sustaining the practice. Self-help repossession may be constitutional,
but it is probably despite, not because of, the absence of any state involvement beyond allowance plus enforcement.
The following sections examine the two aspects of self-help repossession which may render its allowance by the state unconstitutional:
(1) the lack of notice to the debtor and an opportunity for him to be
heard prior to the repossession on the question of his default or defenses; (2) the physical interference by one private party with another's
possession.
II. The Right to a Prior Hearing
One consequence of allowing repossession under U.C.C. section
59. This means, of course, that if Fuentes v. Shevin is correctly decided,
any self-help repossession which does not differ materially from the state-assisted
repossession involved in Fuentes would be a fortiori unconstitutional. See Catz
& Robinson, Due Process and Creditor's Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to
Mitchell, North Georgia and Beyond, 28 RUT. L REV. 541, 570-71 (1975); Steinheimer,
Address-Summary Prejudgment Creditors' Remedies and Due Process of Law: Continuing Uncertainty After Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Company, 32 WASH. & LFE L. REv. 79,
86-87 (1975); Note, Self-Help Repossession Under the Uniform Commercial Code:
The Constitutionality of Article 9, Section 503, 4 N.M.L Rav. 75, 104 n.140 (1973);
Note, Summary Creditor Remedies: Going . .. Going . . . Gone?, 10 SAN DinGO
L. REv. 292, 324 (1973). See also text accompanying note 99 infra.
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9-503 is that a debtor loses control of the chattel without notice and prior
to a hearing at which the merits of the dispute are resolved.
It is important to understand what the constitutional issue regarding notice and hearing in repossession and other cases is-and what it is
not. The issue is not whether someone with a.legal claim to "property"
eventually shall have a hearing regarding that claim. This should be
obvious, but much of the rhetoric decrying the deprivation of property
without due process of law suggests that it is not.60 The issue is: when
must parties who have a dispute over some type of liberty, property or
contractual right receive a hearing and which, if either, party may act,
pending the adjudication,as if he would win. This issue of the timing of
resort to the courts or other adjudicatory bodies is the issue involved in
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., Fuentes v. Shevin, Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., and North GeorgiaFinishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.; it is also
the issue in Goldberg v. Kelly, Board of Regents v. Roth, Perry v.
Sinderman, Arnett v. Kennedy, Goss v. Lopez, and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.6 1 In order to see this more clearly it may be useful to
60. One commentator, for example, states: '.The due process balance cannot be
drawn solely in economic terms; rather, intangible factors must be taken into account,
the most important of which is the strength of our ethical belief, grounded in the Constitution, that a prson should not be deprived of his possessory interest in property without
notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Cost is not irrelevant, but it must be analyzed
within the broader framework." Yudof, Reflections on PrivateRepcssession, Public Policy and the Constitution, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 954, 970-71 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Yudof]. Because Yudof does not modify "deprived" by "temporarily," the implication is strong that a day in court is what is at stake. If Yudof does mean temporarily
deprived, then his point is empty. However much we might believe that no one should
be temporarily deprived of property without a prior hearing, we cannot do anything
about it. See text accompanying notes 70-73 infra.
61. In Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), the Court struck down
a Wisconsin statute permitting the garnishment of wages without notice and opportunity
for hearing. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Court struck down Florida
and Pennsylvania replevin statutes allowing seizure without notice or hearing. The facts
that a double value bond was required of the creditor and that the debtor could obtain
the chattel upon the posting of his own bond were not deemed sufficient to sustain the
statutes. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court upheld Louisiana's sequestration procedure which allowed a creditor to seize the claimed chattel upon
an ex parte application to a judge showing the basis of the creditor's claim and the posting of a bond. The debtor could put the creditor to proof of his claim immediately and
could regain control of the chattel by posting a bond. In North Ga. Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), the Court struck down a Georgia garnishment
statute as applied to the garnishment of a corporation's bank account. The statute required the creditor to present an affidavit to a court clerk stating the amount due and
apprehension of loss and to post a double value bond as well. The debtor could dissolve the garnishment by posting his own bond. The Court distinguished Mitchell on
the grounds that the affidavit there had to be more than conclusory and had to be reviewed by a judge, and that the debtor was entitled to a hearing immediately after the
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pause and examine briefly the place of the right to a hearing in the
overall constitutional scheme.
It is necessary to begin with the distinction between legislative and

adjudicative facts. 62 An adjudicative fact is one which a legislature or
administrative agency cannot find and act upon without some sort of an
adjudicative proceeding satisfying procedural due process, ordinarily a
hearing at which affected parties can appear and dispute the fact. 3 By

comparison, a legislative fact is one which need not be established at an
adjudicative hearing 4 before it can be found and acted upon by the
legislature or an administrative agency.A5 Where the validity of either
seizure. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court held that due process
required notice and hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court held that Wisconsin did not have to provide a hearing for non-tenured teachers with one-year contracts prior to deciding not
to retain them for another year. In Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the Court
decided that de facto tenure of a teacher employed in a state college would entitle him
to a pre-termination hearing. In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), the Court
upheld the Lloyd-Lafollette Act's procedures for removal of non-probationary federal
employees. Those procedures did not afford a trial-type hearing until after removal.
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Court struok down an Ohio statute allowing
10-day suspensions of public school students without a hearing before or immediately
after the order of suspension. Jackson has been discussed in the text accompanying
notes 48-53 supra.
For other opinions dealing with the right to a prior hearing, see Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (Q974) (seizure of yacht used for unlawful
purposes); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (loss of good-time credits); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971)
(declaration that person could not be served liquor for one year).
62. See 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATVE LAw TREAISE § 7.02 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIS].
63. Id. See also Note, Housing,supra note 50, at 897-98, 906.
64. Of course, the issue is very controversial concerning just what is an adjudicative hearing sufficient to comply with the requirement that only an adjudicative fact
which has been properly established at such a hearing can justify governmental action.
See note 69 infra. It may be the case that some adjudicative facts may be established
through procedures bearing very little resemblance to hearings as we normally think of
them. See note 69 infra. See also Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and the Right to Be
Heard: The Significance of Old Friends, 9 H.Iv. Crv. RIGHTs-CW. LiB. L. Rrv. 449,
460 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Subrin & Dykstra].
65. DAVIs, supra note 62, at § 7.02. Several factors complicate this neat distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts. To begin with, legislative and adjudicative facts generally differ only in degree, so that the line between them always appears
somewhat arbitrary. Principles of morality and justice and the most basic social policies
might be considered pure legislative facts. As we move to consideration of lower level
policies, those which are the means to higher level ones-as, for example, when we move
from "drive safely" to "drive 55 M.P.H. on the highway" to "drive 35 M.P.H. at this
curve"---we encounter a gray area. (Ironically, some commentators urge the least judicial deference to legislative choice when the choice concerns abstract moral principles
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legislative or administrative action depends upon the existence of adjudicative facts which have not been properly established at an adjudicative
hearing, the action may be struck down as invalid on its face or as
applied to a particular party (unless the party is allowed an adjudicative
hearing at which the previous finding is disregarded). 66
rather than concrete social policies. Slee Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YAILE LJ. 221 (1973).)
Moreover, whenever judicial review of legislative or administrative action occurs,
the party attacking the action can urge the non-existence of the legislative facts upon
which the validity of the action depends, and will be doing so in an adjudicative setting.
See Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. Cr. REv. 75. See
also Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. Rnv. 721, 757 (1975); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123
U. PA. L. REV. 1267-68 (1975). (Of course, if the court adopts a minimal review standard, the party challenging a legislative fact will have a more difficult burden of proof
than when challenging an adjudicative fact.)
The legislative-adjudicative fact distinction is also ambiguous with respect to the status of facts about fact-finding procedures (i.e., which procedures minimize error, monetary and other costs, such as delay, etc.). The courts tend to treat facts about factfinding as a species of legislative fact, but not one which entitles a legislative finding
thereof to any special judicial deference.
Finally, the term adjudicative fact is infelicitous to the extent that it suggests no
such fact can be acted upon until it has been established in an adjudication, and that
it suggests a trial-type procedure is required to establish all facts of this type. Many
non-trial type procedures for establishing adjudicative facts may qualify as comporting
full due process, especially if they are the basis for action pending a more trial-like subsequent proceeding for final determination of adjudicative facts. (And, of course, many
legislative facts are established before legislatures and administrative bodies in proceedings that resemble formal trials.)
66. When the validity of legislative action rests upon the existence of an adjudicative fact, two constitutional doctrines may be invoked to strike it down. First, the legislation may be deemed a bill of attainder, the essence of classical bills of attainder being
that they were legislative findings of adjudicative facts. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9,
el. 3, and § 10, cl. 1; United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Ely, United States v. Lovett: Litigating the Separation of
Powers, 10 HA v. Crv. RiGHTS-Cv. Lm. L. REV. 1 (1975); Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE LJ.
330 (1962). See also Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARv. CIrv. RIGHTs-CLY. LIB. L
REV. 269, 284, 287-88 n.54 (1975).
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), can be viewed as a bill of attainder case.
In that case a statute regulating the sale of money orders created an exception by name
for the American Express Company. The Supreme Court held that the exception violated the equal protection clause, despite having found that American Express possessed
characteristics which would justify its exception. The vice of the statute was that it
failed to specify those characteristics and instead "adjudicated" which entities possessed
them at the time the statute was enacted. Similarly, the vice of a bill of attainder is
that the relation between the class or person designated by the statute and the ideal class
(in terms of permissible legislative purposes) is not of a timeless, causally or logically
necessary quality, of which the legislature could take notice, but is instead a function
of particular historical events.
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The basic purpose of the procedural due process requirements
associated with the right to a hearing on adjudicative facts-notice, -the
right to be heard, the right to present evidence, the right to crossexamine witnesses, the right to counsel, the right to an impartial
Another constitutional doctrine used to invalidate legislation premised upon the existence of adjudicative facts is the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. See Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry,
413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). When the legitimacy of a governmental action depends entirely upon the existence of fact X, and the legislature declares
that the action can be taken upon the finding (in an adjudicative proceeding) of adjudicative fact Y, the courts deem the legislative action as having created an irrebuttable
presumption of X whenever Y is found. The courts will strike the legislation down if:
(1) X does not always follow from a finding of Y, or, if y is made the exclusive proof
of X, not-X does not always follow from not-Y; (2) the courts do not believe that the
efficiency gained by the presumption justifies making Y rather than X the essential adjudicative fact (efficiency being usually a second legislative goal in these statutes in addition to the goal to which X is related); and (3) no facts other than X and efficiency
could justify the action. See Note, Legislative Purpose,Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE LJ. 123 (1972). See also note 69 infra, for discussion of the goal of
efficiency. Because every equal protection case in which there is an imperfect fit between the legislative classification and its purpose or purposes can be viewed as raising
an irrebuttable presumption problem, and because the key issue in equal protection
cases is also whether the secondary goal of efficiency will sustain the action despite the
imperfect fit, it is hard to predict when the Supreme Court will use irrebuttable presumption analysis and when it will use ordinary equal protection analysis. Compare the irrebuttable presumption cases above with, for example, Weinberger v. Salfi, 95 S. Ct. 2457
(1975); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). See
also Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 376-77 (1973). The choice
may be one of consequence, for the Court generally employs a stricter standard of review
with the irrebuttable presumption analysis. See generally Sewell, Conclusive Presumptions and/or Substantive Due Process of Law, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 151 (1974); Note,
Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449 (1975); Note,
Irrebuttable Presumptions As An Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: From Rodriguez to
LaFleur, 62 GEo. L.J 1173 (1974); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 87 HA~v. L. REv. 1534 (1974); Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 800 (1974).
See also Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARv. Civ. Rixorrs-Civ. Lm. L. REv. 269
(1975).
Together, the bill of attainder clauses and the irrebuttable presumption doctrine,
along with the techniques traditionally employed under the equal protection and due
process clauses, the First Amendment, and other constitutional provisions, limit the purposes the legislature can pursue, mandate a high degree of congruence between legislative
class and purposes, and require that the congruence be of a relatively timeless, necessary
quality.
The dissent in Morey apparently felt that if the adjudicative facts about American
Express could be established in an adjudicative proceeding, the Supreme Court should
not invalidate the statute, but instead should wait until those facts no longer existed (or
existed for other companies) and then invalidate the statute as applied. The difference
between the majority and dissent can be viewed as one over how timeless must be the
facts upon which the legislation's validity rests. The approach of the dissent that the
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tribunal 7 -is to minimize error in the finding of adjudicative facts. 68

Every step towards eradicating error in the fact-finding process involves
costs. These costs may be measured by loss of money, time, manpower,
discipline, security, or privacy. Because error cannot be eliminated

entirely, and because the costs of reducing it as much as would be
possible with a total effort toward that end would be excessive, the most
reasonable approach is to vary the requirements of due process (and
facts need not be very timeless is followed where administrative action is in question.
So long as parties get a hearing on the adjudicative facts, the administrative action can
be based upon them (and thus be very timebound in its validity). See Davis, supra note
62, at § 7.10. That is true, of course, as long as at the hearing no deference is accorded
the prior administrative findings of adjudicative facts. See Nathanson, Probing the
Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations and Standards of Judicial Review Under
the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 721,
757 (1975). But see DAvis, supra note 62, at § 7.10.
67. Whether there is a due process right to judicial review of administrative adjudication is very controversial. Judicial review by an Article M court does have the advantage of the independence of the judiciary secured by the Constitution, and such independence may be lacking in even those executive courts free from the control of the
party agency. In addition, judicial review provides a chance to challenge legislative facts
which support the legislative or administrative rule in question, and the sufficiency of
evidence and procedures used in adjudication. Moreover, courts hax e more expertise regarding constitutional and other legal standards than do agencies. But judicial review
is not a panacea, and it is possible to have an unwise or corrupt court of last resort
as well as a wise and impartial agency. Whether due process requires judicial review,
and the relation of that question to the scope of Congress's power under Article III to
limit the jurisdiction of federal courts, are, fortunately, tangential to this article. Even
if judicial review of administrative action could be eliminated by the federal and state
legislative branches without violating the due process clauses of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments (or, in the case of federal courts, Article III), due process would still require a hearing or its equivalent before the administrative agency on all adjudicative
facts. That requirement would bind the agency, even though the agency would rule on
the sufficiency of the hearing and interpret all other legal standards, and even though
no court would have jurisdiction to decide that a refusal by the agency to hold a hearing
constituted a denial of due process.
If judicial review of administrative findings of adjudicative facts is a requirement
of due process, then I assume the adjudicative proceeding must produce a record and
a statement of the administrative findings (and perhaps the administrative rule being followed) so that the reviewing court can assess meaningfully the sufficiency of the evidence
and the constitutionality of the action. If a proceeding satisfying due process is not held
at the administrative level, but the facts found by the agency are adjudicative in nature,
a judicial proceeding must occur which, when added to the administrative proceeding,
will satisfy due process requirements for the finding of adjudicative facts. Clearly no
deference should be accorded any finding of adjudicative facts ini a proceeding not comporting with due process. See note 66 supra. See generally McCormack, The Purpose of
Due Process: Fair Hearing or Vehicle for Judicial Review?, 25 TEXAS L. REv. 1257
(1974); Buss, ProceduralDue Processfor School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional
Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 631-39 (1971).
68. See Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits
on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1510, 1540 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Procedures].
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therefore the accuracy of the procedure) depending upon what is at
stake in the dispute over the adjudicative facts. 69
69. If the adjudicative facts in issue in a dispute over some governmental action
relate to efficiency (e.g., the efficiency of a governmental employee) and efficiency is
the proper value for the government to base its action upon (as it would be in most
government personnel decisions but not, for example, in programs which confer rights
based on need, such as welfare), then the proper due process procedures would be the
most efficient (i.e., those which produced the optimum relation of error to their
cost). In other words, in those areas where the government constitutionally can operate
like a private enterprise, maximizing benefits relative to costs, its procedures for resolving disputes over adjudicative facts should be those procedures whose marginal costs
equal the marginal benefit (in inefficiency detected) they produce. Such procedures
might include particular management techniques bearing little if any resemblance to a
trial-type proceeding. The only "right" of the present or potential governmental employee, unless he has a contract which protects him even when he is not the most qualified for the job, is to have the government act efficiently and to avoid, for example,
preference towards less qualified employees for racial reasons. See Nagel, Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination,2 PHiL. & PuB. A-FAms 348 (1973). But see
Subrin & Dykstra, supra note 64, at 471-72; Note, Procedures, supra note 68, at 1540.
See also Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961);
Comment, Due Process and Public Employment in Perspective: Arbitrary Dismissals
of Non-Civil Service Employees, 19 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 1052 (1972). (However, if being
rejected for or fired from a government job affects a person's reputation more than being
rejected for or fired from private employment, there may be a right to more than efficient adjudication procedures. And it should be born in mind that the discussion here
concerns only those procedures constitutionally required to be paid for by the state
itself. If the rejected employee is ready to pay the full cost of more extensive procedures in order to prove his qualifications, efficiency obviously cannot be invoked to deny
him that opportunity.) (There are other areas where the government has some discretion to define substantive rights solely for utilitarian [efficient] reasons, and where
the only "right" of the person affected by such a definition is to have the government's
action in fact be efficient. In those areas, which include parts of private tort, property,
and contract law, the government's procedures for adjudication permissibly might be designed solely to produce an efficient level of error, as long as the adjudication is restricted to "rights" within the area of discretion.) (Even where the due process procedures need only be efficient and perhaps need not even include a hearing, if administrative agency action is in question and judicial review is allowed or constitutionally
mandated [see note 67 supra], there is something such review can accomplish: it can ensure that the substantive area is oie where efficiency is properly a dominant value, that
the procedures are designed to promote efficiency, and that the administrators are in fact
following those procedures and are not using impermissible criteria, such as race, speech,
etc., instead). For another area besides government employment where the proper
adjudication procedures may bear little resemblance to a hearing, see DAvis, supra note
62, at § 7.09 (discussing the use of on-the-spot inspections as alternatives to hearings in
certain cases); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1103-5 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding reexamination to be an acceptable alternative to a hearing on a failing bar exam).
In areas where the government cannot act solely on the basis of efficiency because
there are rights involved other than the general right of taxpayers to efficient governmental action, the cost-benefit approach to due process will not suffice. Even if the
non-monetary costs could be reduced to a monetary or other common denominator,
which is difficult enough in the areas where efficiency is a legitimate sole purpose, where
efficiency is not a legitimate sole purpose the fair distribution of costs is as important
or more important than their total. The cost of an error here is not merely part of
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There is one cost of procedural due process that merits attention
because it is the central cost in pre-hearing repossession and is also the
cost over which several Supreme Court "right to hearing" battles have
the overall cost of the program to the taxpayers, but is a cost borne by a particular individual in the enjoyment of his rights. (Where the individual's "right" is merely an in-.
strument for the accomplishment of general societal goals [e.g., the "right" 'vindicated in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), and in First Amendment overbreadth cases brought by those not within the
unconstitutional applications of the statutes, such as Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507 (1948)], so that procedural costs are aligned against speech and privacy costs to
the public in general, a cost-benefit approach might work if one could find a common
denominator for the costs and benefits.) For example, although the government might
be able constitutionally to revoke welfare, to the extent that welfare is provided, it must
be provided according to the need and desert of the recipients, and not according to criteria such as race, politics, religion, hair color, etc. S'ee Van Alstyne, The Demise of
the Right-Privilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HAnv. L. Rav. 1439 (1968).
See also DAVis, supra note 62, at § 7.12. Possession of characteristics which make more
efficient the adjudication of one's need and desert, unlike possession of characteristics
which make more efficient the adjudication of one's employment credentials, is not itself
relevant to need or desert and therefore cannot be used to distinguish among the needy
and deserving.
Justice Rehnquist, writing in Arnett v. Kennedy, suggested that the government
might be able to escape the requirements of procedural due process by qualifying the
substantive rights it grants with limitations on the procedures for their vindication. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 148-52 (1974). See also Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HAav. L. Rav. 1669, 1720 n.255 (1975); Comment,
Fear of Firing: Arnett v. Kennedy and the Protection of Federal Career Employees, 10
HARv. Crv. RiGHTs-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 472, 481-86 (1975); The Supreme Court, 1973
Term, 88 HAv. L. Rv. 41, 83-90 (1974); Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due
Process of Law, 1974 DuKE LJ. 89 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Entitlement]. The
point to be made is that although Justice Rehnquist may be correct in the context of
government employment and other similar contexts, substantive constitutional restrictions, including the restrictions regarding bills of attainder and irrebuttable presumptions
(note 66 supra), limit generally the extent to which the government can qualify substance by procedure.
If cost-benefit analysis will not work for pure personal rights, and works best where
the only right at stake is the general right of taxpayers to an efficient program, Rawls'
maximin principle appears more promising. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTrCE, 152-57
(1971). (Rawls himself does not discuss at any length the problem of allocating resources to adjudication procedures. See id. at 240-41. Nor does his principal libertarian
critic, Robert Nozick, offer a libertarian theory of just procedures of adjudication. See
R. NozrcK, ANAcHY, STAT AND UTOPIA (1974).) Maximin would mandate procedures
that maximized the position of the least advantaged person. It would apparently require
that an amount be spent on perfecting procedures of adjudication such that any greater
expenditure would be to the disadvantage of that person who, in attempting to vindicate
his rights, should win (from the standpoint of an omniscient observer), but who loses
due to an error, the likelihood of which could have been reduced by incurring greater
costs in the adjudicative process. If the consequence of an erroneous 6djudication were
death, such as in a capital criminal case, or abject poverty, such as in a determination of eligibility for welfare, maximin would mandate expenditures on perfecting adjudications up to the point where one's chances of death or poverty through diversion of resources from other areas and general social impoverishment equalled one's chances of
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been fought. That cost is the time involved in the adjudicatory process

itself. During that time only one party to the dispute can act as if he
were the winner on the merits. 70 If the other party subsequently wins at
the hearing, the losses he suffered during the hearing while the first
party acted as if he were winner may not be recoupable.
death or poverty through an erroneous adjudication. If the consequence of an erroneous
adjudication were less grave, then lower expenditures on procedures would be required.
This seems intuitively correct, and our present institutions appear to be based roughly
on this conception of procedural justice. Cf. C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEviTABariY oF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974). (One problem with the Rawlsian approach to procedural due process is whether such an approach makes sense in a society
which does not follow the Rawlsian approach to problems of justice across the board.
For example, can the amount we are required to spend on procedures be determined by
maximin, but not the amount each person should be taxed to pay for those procedures?
Or can the least advantaged person in the context of procedural due process be determined without reference to the general distribution of wealth?) (There is another frequently mentioned approach to deciding what costs procedural due process requires we
incur. That approach requires no more than that we equalize the litigation resources of
the adversaries, whatever those resources might be. Thus, whatever amount the government could spend to convict, the defendant would also be entitled to for his defense.
Under this approach there might be a high incidence of erroneous adjudications, but everyone would seem to have an equal chance, at the outset, of suffering for benefiting]
from one. However, this approach does not differ materially from one in which all social
goods are distributed through a lottery, and persons in Rawls' "original position" would
probably choose a maximin approach to problems of justice in preference to a lottery
approach. See J. RAwLs, A THEORY oF JUsTIcE, 118-94 (1971). Also, this approach has
no application to non-adversarial procedures for adjudication.)
What we end up with, then, is that procedures required by due process for finding
adjudicative facts vary according to whether and which rights other than a general right
to efficiency are involved, the gravity of the consequences of error, and the costs, monetary and non-monetary, which are involved. See generally Friendly, "Some Kind of
Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975); Buss, Procedural Due Process for School
Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 545 (1971); Note,
Procedures, supra note 68; Comment, Entitlement, supra note 69, at 120-21; Note, Housing, supranote 50, at 891-92.
Finally, all of what has been said in this footnote, with the exception of the discussion of equalizing litigants' resources, relates to the minimum procedures and resources which must be provided in adjudications. We generally allow a party to use
resources beyond the minimum required by due process if he is willing to pay the costs
involved, as we do, for example, when we allow privately-retained counsel to appear in
situations where due process does not require.counsel at all. But see Mayer v. Chicago,
404 U.S. 189 (1971); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956). Cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
For the related issue of litigation access fees, see Michelman, The Supreme Court
and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part 1, 1973 DUKE LJ.
1153; Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part11, 1974 DUKE L.J. 527.
70. Sometimes neither party can act as if he were the winner during the pendency
of the action. Property which is the subject of a debtor-creditor dispute might be held
by the state pending the outcome. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974). Similarly, although the state can incarcerate an alleged felon awaiting trial,
it can do so only to ensure his appearance, and not for other penal purposes.
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There is an unavoidable paradox here. Every interest, no matter
how small, is theoretically protected by the due process right to some
sort of hearing 7' on adjudicative facts. 71 Yet, the delay associated with
the hearing itself may cause an irreparable loss to the eventual winner. A
person may have the right to a hearing over a .one dollar debt. But the
delay suffered by the party who does not have the right to act as if he
were the winner while he awaits the outcome of a hearing may result in
much more than a one dollar unrecoverable loss. A person cannot be
sentenced to a day in jail without a hearing at which the prosecution
must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But he can be incarcerated
for months pending trial after a hearing at which the standard was only
probable cause;7 2 a and he can be incarcerated two or three days
without any hearing whatsoever (although the administrator-the arresting policeman-must have had probable cause for the arrest). Irreparable injury due to the temporary incarceration may be suffered by one
who later proves his innocence at the required hearing. If this irreparable injury due to the time taken to adjudicate a dispute is deemed
"property" or "liberty," then it is not and cannot be entirely true that no
one can be deprived of "property" or "liberty" without due process of
73
law.
Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell and Di-Chem, as well as Goldberg,
Roth, Perry, Arnett, Jackson and Goss, all involved what I call the
timing issue, the issue of which party, if either, could act as if he were
the winner during the pendency of the hearing. In each of these cases the
eventual winner stood to incur a loss if the right to act as winner
pending the adjudication were denied him. One part, (the debtor in
71. By "hearing" here I also mean non-hearing adjudicative procedures in those
areas where they are sufficient for full due process. See note 69 supra.
72. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.21 (1972).
72a. And the hearing need not be an adversary one. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975).
73. See note 60 supra. See also Note, Terminations, supra note 51, at 1484 n.42;
Note, The Growth of Procedural Due Process into a New Substance: An Expanding
Protection for Personal Liberty and a "Specialized Type of Property . . .in Our Economic System," 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 502, 508-9, 509-10 n.26, 524-25 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Due Process].
Where the government is a party to the dispute it, of course, has no right to due
process as such. But taxpayers and other citizens do have rights not to have inefficient
employees in government jobs, ineligible recipients on the welfare rolls, or disruptive students in tax-supported schools. Where the dispute is between private parties, both parties have due process rights in the literal sense. See also Note, Procedures, supra note
68, at 1535.
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Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell and Di-Chem, the public school teacher in
Perry and Roth, the government employee in Arnett, the welfare recipient in Goldberg, the student in Goss, the utility user in Jackson) stood

to suffer a temporary loss of control over property and (in Perry, Roth,
Goss and Arnett) a temporary loss of status as well, when, with a good
claim on the merits, he had a legitimate expectation that this would not
happen. 74 The duration and extent of the loss depended upon such
factors as whether he could regain control over the property by posting a

bond, 75 how quickly the issue on the merits could be resolved in a due
process hearing, 76 and upon how speedy and adequate were the restitutionary and other remedies provided.77 At stake for the other party,

where his claim was meritorious, was the loss of property because of
waste, concealment, conveyance, destruction and/or judgment-proof
status, as in Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell and Di-Chem; efficiency in
handling personnel matters, such as hiring, firing and assignment, as in
Perry, Roth and Arnett; or maintenance of discipline and order, as in
Arnett and Goss. 78 At stake for both parties in some cases was the
74. Of course, even more would be at stake in cases such as Roth, Perry, Arnett,
Goldberg and Goss if the courts accepted or accorded weight to determinations by administrators reached without a due process hearing.
"Appellants point to the fact that some process is provided under Ohio law by way
of judicial review. OmHo REV. CODE § 2501.06 (Supp. 1973). Appellants do not cite
any case in which this general administrative review statute has been used to appeal from
a disciplinary decision by a school official. If it be assumed that it could be so used,
it is for two reasons insufficient to save inadequate procedures at the school level First,
although new proof may be offered in a § 2501.06 proceeding, Shaker Coventry Corp.
v. Shaker Heights Planning Comm'n, 18 Ohio App. 2d 27, 176 N.E.2d 332 (1961), the
proceeding is not de novo. In re Lock, 33 Ohio App. 2d 177, 294 N.E.2d 230 (1972).
Thus the decision by the school--even if made upon inadequate procedures-is entitled
to weight in the court proceeding. . . ." Goss v. Lopez, 419 'U.S. 565, 581-82, n.10
(1975).
If no reasons for the governmental action are given, the affected party will most
likely have a more difficult time in court showing that action to be unconstitutional or
otherwise unlawful. See note 67 supra. See also O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice
Denied: The Welfare Prior Hearing Cases, 1970 Sup. Cr. Rav. 161, 188.
75. See, e.g., Fuentes,Mitchell and Di-Chem.
76. See Fuentes, Mitchell and Di-Chem. See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
582 n.10 (1975): ". . . Second, without a demonstration to the contrary, we must assume that delay will attend any § 2501.06 [judicial] proceeding, that the suspension will
not be stayed pending hearing, and that the student meanwhile will irreparably lose his
educational benefits." See also Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, reh. denied, 420 U.S.
955 (1975).
77. See, e.g., Fuentes, Mitchell and Di-Chem. See also the quotation from Goss
v. Lopez, id.
78. See note 85 infra, for governmental interests similar to maintenance of order
which have been sufficient to allow pre-hearing governmental action adverse to private
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burden of proof, which may have been very important.
The Supreme Court response in all of these cases, except Mitchell,
was to decide vhether one party had a "property" interest of which he
was deprived without notice and hearing. If the Court found he had a
"property" interest, then, unless there were special circumstances, 0 a
taking prior to a due process hearing was a deprivation of property
without due process of law. 8 ' In other words, the party with the property
interest had the right to act as winner pending the due process hearing.
The Court seemed to define "property" by equating it with the status
quo at the time the other party acted. Thus, in Sniadach, Fuentes, DiChem and Goldberg, the status quo found the debtors with full control
over their money and other property and the welfare recipient receiving
a monthly check for a certain amount. In Perry and Roth, however, the
status quo for a teacher on a year-to-year contract was to be unemployed
at the end of the year. His status was no different from that of the
person initially applying for a teaching job or for welfare. On the other
hand, for a teacher with tenure, the status quo was that of being
employed. Hence, tenure converted employment into "property."
The problem with the "status quo" approach to the timing issue is
that it is inflexible and fails to take account of the many factors which
would, in certain cases, lead to a state's favoring the party seeking to
change the status quo.82 The real question is this: where there is a
dispute, which party's interpretation of the facts is going to determine
the status quo pending an adjudication? There is no reason at all, at
least none that rises to the level of a constitutional mandate, for answering, as does the "status quo" approach, that it is the party who was
entitled to the item in dispute when last the disputing parties agreed
interests. The paradigmatic situation where pre-hearing governmental action is allowed
occurs when a person is arrested and detained for commission of a crime. Of course,
in such situations the Constitution requires a prompt probable cause hearing before a
magistrate, except when the arrest is pursuant to a grand jury indictment.
79. In those cases where the administrative action could be challenged only in a
judicial proceeding, the burden of proof of wrongful agency action would be on the affected individual. The burden might easily determine the outcome, especially where the
reasons for the administrative action were unstated or unclear. See Van Alstyne, The
ConstitutionalRights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE .J. 841, 859-60.
80. See note 85 infra.
81. The court, of course, never reached the due process issue in Jackson. See text
accompanying notes 48-53 supra.
82. See text accompanying notes 85-87 infra.
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84
upon the facts.8 3 It is true, as some commentators have pointed out,

that a unilateral determination by one party may upset the expectations
of the other party and also may be made in bad faith. However, it is often

ignored that these facts apply equally to both parties regardless of who is
maintaining the status quo and who is upsetting it. For example, the
creditor has expectations that he will continue to receive payments from
the debtor, just as the debtor has expectations that he will continue to

83. The status quo must be defined as of that time when both parties agreed upon
the facts. Otherwise it would be a function of one party's or the other's interpretation
and could not serve as a basis for deciding which party to favor pending a due process
hearing.
"Possession" is even less satisfactory than "status quo" as a basis for resolving
the timing issue. Although physical grasping is a brute fact, the "possession" involved
in repossession is usually not an actual physical grasping, but a legal construct signifying
the right to control. And the state which grants the debtor the right to control can be
deemed, by permitting repossession, to have qualified that right in the following manner:
As against the creditor, the debtor's right to control does not exist whenever the creditor
makes evident his intent to take control because of his belief that there has been a default. If there has been no default, the debtor's only recourse is in a subsequent suit.
At the moment the creditor begins to repossess, the debtor has no legal possession, at
least not superior to the creditor's legal possession. At most the debtor can attain physical possession by physically grasping the item and wrongfully withholding it from the
creditor.
Several examples illustrate in other situations the dependence of non-physical possession on the state's determination of the timing issue. X parks his car in a parking
lot owned by Y. When he returns he owes Y a dollar. He gives Y what looks like
a dollar bill, but Y says that it appears counterfeit to him and that he will not accept
it. X denies that it is counterfeit. The car is still on Y's lot. X has the keys to it.
Both men are 20. feet away from it. Who is in "possession"? Can it be determined
until we know whether the state gives Y a lien on the car or gives X the right to drive
it away in such situations? Or suppose Y is a contractor and X a subcontractor. Under
the terms of the contract between them, X is allowed to drive one of Y's trucks both
during and after work each day for the duration of the contract. X and Y have a dispute, and Y tells X that their contract is terminated. X declares that, as far as he is
concerned, the contract is still in effect. X has parked Y's truck on the street adjacent
to the jobsite and has the keys in his pocket. Both men are 20 feet from the truck.
Who is in "possession"?
The Supreme Court in Mitchell appeared to recognize property rights could not resolve the timing issue because the state's resolution of the timing issue would be deemed
a qualification of such rights: "The reality is that both seller and buyer had current,
real interests in the property, and the definition of property rights is a matter of state
law. Resolution of the due process question must take account not only of the interests
of the buyer of the property but those of seller as well." 416 U.S. at.604. See also
Subrin & Dykstra, supra note 64, at 468-69; Comment, Entitlement, supra note 69,
at 110-14; The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HAnv. L Ruv. 41, 73-74 n.18 (1974).
84. See, e.g., Yudof, supra note 60, at 977-78.
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enjoy possession. Both are equally likely to act in bad faith in determin-

ing whether there has been a default.
The general factors which should be considered in deciding which
party should be able to act as the winner during the pendency of the

adjudication are: (1) which party can best afford the losses occasioned
by delay (losses here include more than monetary losses), and which

party's losses can be most easily restored; 85 (2) which party's losses will
85. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 608 (1974); Note, The Evolving Definition of ProceduralDue Process in Debtor-CreditorRelations: From Sniadach
to North Georgia Finishing, 8 Loy. L.A.L. Ray. 339, 352 (1975).
To the extent that the law can compensate the winning party for his losses (including those attributable to not being able to act as if he had won during the pendency
of the hearing) without violating maximin and without over-chilling good faith prosecution and defense by losing parties, it clearly should. But the extent to which such losses
are irreparable should weigh heavily in deciding which of the disputing parties should be
allowed to act as if he were already the winner during the pendency of the action. Thus,
not only can the government generally better afford losses than individuals because of
its ability to spread the losses among the taxpayers, but it also can often more easily convert nonmonetary losses (e.g., disorder in schools pending suspension or expulsion of
troublemakers) into monetary ones (e.g., by hiring more administrators, security personnel). On the other hand, a poor person deprived of the necessities of life pending an
adjudication may not be able to survive until he can be compensated. (This fact would
explain Goldberg,but not its apparent limitation to terminations of welfare as opposed to
refusals to grant initially. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970); Comment,
Entitlement, supra note 69, at 112-13 n.93. See also Randone v. Appellate Department, 5
Cal. 3d 536, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971); Scott, Constitutional Regulation
of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L
REv. 807, 862-64 (1975); Comment, A Proposal for a Constitutional. Innkeepers'
Lien Statute, 24 BuFFALO L. REv. 369, 383 (1975); Note, Randone Revisited: Due Process Protectionfor Commercial Necessities, 26 STAN. L. REv. 673 (1974); Note, Termininations, supra note 51, at 1482-83; Note, Due Process, supra note 73; Comment, The
Constitutional Minimum for the Termination of Welfare Benefits: The Need for and
Requirements of a Prior Hearing, 68 MicH. L R.Ev. 112, 119-28 (1969). Of course,
there is a danger in characterizing the right to a prior hearing as one protecting a necessity of life when one moves outside the welfare area to the area of private disputes; for
the debtor may be wrongfully holding in any case what represents in monetary value
a necessity of life for the creditor but what is not a necessity for the debtor. Labels
such as "creditor," "debtor," "wage earner," "corporation," etc., give rise oftentimes to
very misleading stereotypes. Compare Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337,
341-42 (1969), with Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88-90 (1972) and North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 608 (1975).)
Moreover, as far as
I am aware, a vendee cannot use self-help against a vendor who has failed to deliver
an item which is a necessity of life for the former; and this restriction has not engendered any serious constitutional attacks.
Sometimes there is an emergency of the type that were government unable to act
as if it were the winner pending the adjudication, the public would suffer irreparable
injury which it could afford less than the opposing party, whom it would usually be able
to compensate. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the right of the government
to act prior to any hearing in such situations: "Fuentes reaffirmed. . . that, in limited
circumstances, immediate seizure of a property interest, without an opportunity for prior
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most affect the accuracy of the adjudication;86 and (3) which party is

most likely to be correct in his assertion that he should win (in light of
the evidence known to the party making the claim, and the safeguards

87
against his error, including the incentives not to make false claims).
hearing, is constitutionally permissible. Such circumstances are those in which 'the
seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the
State has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating
the seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standard of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance.' Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Thus, for example, due process is not
denied when postponement of notice and hearing is necessary to protect the public from
contaminated food (citation omitted); from a bank failure (citation omitted); from
misbranded drugs (citation omitted); to aid the collection of taxes (citation omitted); or
to aid the war effort (citation omitted)." Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663, 678-79 (1974) (involving governmental seizure of a yacht used for unlawful purposes without providing the owner of the yacht with notice or a hearing). See
also Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Dupuy v. Superior Ct., 15 Cal. 3d 23,
29-31 (1975); DAvis, supra note 62, at § 7.08; Rendleman, The New Due Process:
Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L. REv.531, 582-89, 629-31 (1975).
86. For example, a welfare applicant denied welfare may have insufficient resources with which to litigate effectively. And those who have lost their wages, their
utility services, or their jobs may be unable to undertake extensive litigation to vindicate
their rights. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969); O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied: The Welfare Prior Hearing Cases, 1970 SuP. CT. REv. 161, 201; Van Alstyne,
The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841, 859-60;
Note, Terminations, supra note 51, at 1482-99; Comment, Due Process and Public Employment in Perspective: Arbitrary Dismissals of Non-Civil Service Employees, 19
U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 1052, 1062 (1972).
87. For example, in repossession cases such as Fuentes and Mitchell, there were
substantial financial disincentives to creditors' erroneously declaring default and repossessing, including requirements that they post bonds for double the value of the chattel.
Moreover, nonpayment is relatively easy for a creditor to 'ascertain (although defenses
to nonpayment are more difficult to ascertain, especially given his adverse interests).
See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609-10 (1974). See also Scott, Constitutional Regulation of ProvisionalCreditor Remedies: The Cost of ProceduralDue Process, 61 VA. L. REv. 807 (1975). Comment, Constitutional Restrictions on Termination
of Services by Privately Owned Public Utilities, 39 Mo. L. Rav. 205, 215-16 (1974).
In the welfare context, eligibility may be determined accurately a high percentage of the
time as long as certain forms and procedures (less than required by due process) are
used, even where there is a dispute. On the other hand, the welfare department employee
may not have much of a direct incentive to make accurate determinations of eligibility.
The Supreme Court has expressed a general preference for pre-hearing determinations
of facts made by judges over those made by other government officials (compare Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 615 (1974) with North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. 'DiChem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975)), and for those made by government officials
over those made by private individuals (see the quotation from Calero-Toledo at note
85 supra).
Of course, where it is permissible for efficiency to dictate which adjudicatory procedures will be used, it also should be permissible for it to dictate which party can act
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More particularly, in deciding whether to uphold pre-hearing creditor action, courts should consider the following factors:
(1) Is the item in dispute a basic necessity for one of the
parties? 88
(2) Does the creditor have a security interest in the item or is
such an interest being acquired by creditor's action, and, if
the former, was -the security interest acquired by contract?8"
(3) Is the creditor allowed to take action whenever there is a
default or only if there is a specific threat of loss of the
security?90
(4) Is the protection afforded the dispossessed party adequate
in case he ultimately wins (by virtue of security requireas if he were winner pending the adjudication. See note 69 supra.
For discussion of the considerations involved in the timing issue, see generally,
Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. REv. 807 (1975); Subrin & Dykstra, supra note 64;
O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied:. The Welfare Prior Hearing Cases, 1970
Sup. CT. REv. 161; Comment, Entitlement, supra note 69, at 120-21; Note, The State
University, Due Process and Summary Exclusions, 26 HASTmGS LiJ. 252 (1974); Note,
Terminations, supra note 51; Note, Housing, supra note 50; Note, Due Process, supra
note 73. Comment, ConstitutionalRestrictions on Termination of Services By Privately
Owned Public Utilities, 39 Mo. L. Rav. 205,215-16 (1974).
88. See note 85 supra. The Court in Fuentes and again in Di-Chem rejected distinctions among types of property with respect to the requirement of pre-seizure hearings. And, of course, U.C.C. § 9-503 applies to all chattels, although it is most often
used in connection with automobiles. See generally Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14
WM. & MARY L Rv. 767, especially at 783-84 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Mentschikoff].
89. See McDermott, The Supreme Court's Changing Attitude Toward Consumer
Rpotection (sic) and its Impact on Montana Prejudgment Remedies, 36 MoN's. I. REV.
165, 175-76 (1975); Steinheimer, Summary Prejudgment Creditors' Remedies and Due
Process of Law: Continuing Uncertainty After Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 32 WAsH.
& L L REv. 79, 84-85 (1975). Where there has been a bargain negotiated at armslength, the terms of which permit the vendor unilaterally to declare default, it is not
unfair to the vendee to permit the vendor to do so. It is unclear, however, whether the
Court will distinguish between secured and unsecured creditors with respect to prehearing action. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-7
(1975).
90. Sniadach and Fuentes both indicated possible approval of pre-hearing seizure
of property where there is an immediate danger of destruction or concealment. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 93 (1972). See also Randone v. Appellate Department, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 556-57, 96
Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971); Note, Procedures,supra note 68, at 1531-32; Comment, Self-Help Repossession: The ConstitutionalAttack, the Legislative Response, and
the Economic Implications, 62 GEo. U. 273, 291 (1973); Comment, Self-Help Repossession: Fuentes and the JudicialProcess,46 TEMP. L.Q. 540, 551 n.90, 552 (1973).
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ments, speediness in holding the due process hearing on the
merits,91 the ability of the debtor to regain the property by
92
posting his own bond, and adequacy of remedy, including the creditor's insulation from liability for wrongful

(5)

repossession, attachment, etc. 93)?
Which party (the creditor or the debtor) is more often
found to be legally entitled to the item when the merits are
decided, and what procedures and incentives are present

to ensure that the creditor action is justified (such as probable cause hearings before magistrates,9 4 strict liability for

(6)

wrongful repossession, attachment, etc., 95 and security requirements) ?95a
Which party has the burden of proof at the post-seizure

hearing, and how fair is that burden?
(7) What are the costs of alternatives in terms of availability of
credit and in terms of burdens on the judicial system?90 '
Because it is quite difficult for courts to weigh these factors, and
because creditors and debtors can adjust their behavior, within limits, to

comply with laws concerning such things as security interests and repos91. See Mentschikoff, supra note 88, at 782; Williams, Creditors' Prejudgment
Remedies: Expanding Strictures on Traditional Rights, 25 U. FLA. L. Rav. 60, 106
(1972); Note, The Future of Pre-HearingSeizure in Idaho: Has the 1973 Amendment
of the Claim and Delivery Statute Removed the Constitutional Cloud?, 11 Ir. L Rnv.
247 (1975); Case Comment, 24 CATHOLIC L. REv. 637 (1975); Case Comment, 1975
U. ILL. L FoRum 263; Note, Self-Help Repossession of Consumer Goods: A Constitutional Look at Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 VALPARAiso U.L.
REV. 439, 455 (1973). See also Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, reh. denied, 420
U.S. 955 (1975).
An article by Robert Scott contains an interesting discussion of the relation of the
following factors to minimizing the costs of erroneous adjudications and delay to the
party who should win on the merits: (1) whether the due process hearing is pre- or
post-seizure; (2) if post-seizure, how soon after seizure it occurs; (3) the complexity of
the factual issues; (4) whether the hearing is a final adjudication of the merits or merely
a probable cause hearing; and (5) creditor and debtor bonds. Scott, ConstitutionalRegulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61
VA. L. Rav. 807 (1975).
92. Note the relation of this factor to (1) above.
93. See Dunham, Due Processand Commercial Law, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 135, 15052.
94. Compare North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606
(1975), with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616-20 (1974).
95. See W. PRossER, LAW OF Toms 83-84 (4th ed. 1971).

95a. See Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The
Cost of ProceduralDue Process, 61 VA. L. Rav. 807 (1975).
96. See White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even
More, 1973 Wis. L. Rav. 503, 510-30.
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session rights, a state's package of laws relating to repossession should
be struck down only in the most extreme cases. Too zealous a protection
of the debtor, in addition to increasing the cost of credit, is arguably a
denial of the creditor's right to due process, 97 just as too zealous a
protection of the creditor has been held to be a denial of the debtor's
right to due process."'
Fuentes would appear to invalidate all self-help repossession which
is no more protective of the debtor than the laws in question in that case.
The state action discussion in Part I demonstrated that state permission
of private repossession, like all other state permission of private activity,
is subject to the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, if state-assisted prehearing repossession is unconstitutional, then so, too, is self-help repossession where the only significant difference between the two lies in the
presence or absence of state assistance. Surely the fact that the state has
chosen to spend some money and manpower assisting creditors, perhaps
to reduce the chance of violence, is irrelevant to requiring the state to
hold a hearing and thus spend more. If anything, that fact would suggest
that no hearing is constitutionally required, not the opposite.9 9
It appeared, after Mitchell, that the Supreme Court was abandoning the very mechanical Fuentes approach of protecting "property"
interests, 10 0 and was weighing the various factors that I have said should
be weighed. However, Di-Chem greatly restricts the significance of
Mitchell.'01 Self-help repossession might still be constitutional under
Fuentes and Di-Chem if: (1) the creditor could repossess only if there
were a specific threat of loss of the item in dispute;'
(2) the creditor
had to establish the probability of such a threat and of default at a
hearing before a magistrate immediately after the repossession, and
perhaps, in addition, post a bond; (3) a full hearing on the merits
would occur relatively soon thereafter;10 2a and (4) the debtor could re97. See Catz & Robinson, Due Process and Creditor's Remedies: From Sniadach
and Fuentes to Mitchell, North Georgia and Beyond, 28 Rur. L. Rnv. 541, 564 (1975);
Note, Procedures,supranote 68, at 1531-32.
98. For discussion of the related problem of mechanics' liens, see Note, The Constitutional Validity of Mechanics' Liens Under the Due Process Clause-A Reexamination After Mitchell and North Georgia, 55 B.U.L. REv. 263 (1975).
99. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
100. See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra.
101. The Di-Chem decision seems clearly erroneous, given the security requirement
and the ability of the debtor to regain the property by posting its own bond. Expedition
seems no more important for the large corporate debtor than for the corporate creditor.
102. See note 90 supra.
102a. Case Comment, 24 CATHOLIC L. REV. 637 (1975); Case Comment, 1975 U.
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gain control of the item by posting his own bond. U.C.C. section 9-503
by itself is not limited in these ways' 013 and would therefore be unconstitutional under Fuentes and Di-Chem in many of its applications. But
with additional safeguards section 9-503 can be made constitutional
even under the restrictive' standards of those cases.
MI. The Physical Interference Problem
Aside from the absence of prior notice and a hearing on the merits,
self-help repossession also involves physical interference by a private
party with another's control of property. At least one commentator has
argued for the unconstitutionality of self-help repossession on this basis
alone, asserting that the state is constitutionally compelled to maintain a
monopoly over the right to effect involuntary transfers of property. 0 5
The "property" to which he refers includes "possession." Of course,
"possession" is ordinarily not itself a brute fact, but is a legal conclusion
drawn from facts. Although a debtor is sometimes in physical possession
of property which he can actually grasp, most of the time he "possesses"
the property by virtue of his legal right to maintain dominion and
control over it. Repossession thus rarely involves a wresting away.
Indeed, section 9-503 of the U.C.C. prohibits repossession which would
result in a breach of the peace, and this prohibition has uniformly been
interpreted to include any use of force against the debtor. 0 6
When a person's possession of property is physical in the sense that
he is actually grasping it, there are excellent reasons, such as the
avoidance of violence, property damage, and, in some cases, intrusion
into privacy, not to allow another individual to use self-help to wrest
physical possession from him. Nevertheless, even where possession is
physical there are instances when self-help probably should be, and
usually is, allowed. If the one without physical possession has the legal
right to possess, and the one with physical possession is a thief, self-help
by the former is generally approved, within limits. Or if one with
ILL. L FORUM 263; Note, The Future of Pre-HearingSeizure in Idaho: Has the 1973
Amendment of the Claim and Delivery Statute Removed the Constitutional Cloud?, 11
ID. L. REv. 247 (1975).
103. However, the debtor apparently does have the right under U.C.C. § 9-507 to
an immediate mandatory injunction ordering return of the property if it was wrongfully
seized, and he need not post a bond. See Mentschikoff, supra note 88, at 782.
104. Too restrictive, I would say.
105. Yudof, supranote 60, at 972-80.
106. See Brodsky, Constitutionality of Self-Help Repossession Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: The Eighth and Ninth Circuits Speak, 19 S.D.L. REV. 295, 302-5
(1974); Mentschikoff, supranote 88, at 772, 782.
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rightful physical possession of property in which another has an interest
appears to be ready to abscond with that property or to destroy it, selfhelp generally may be used. In some instances it may be possible to call
upon state officials to prevent the apparent theft or conversion and to
take temporary custody in case the right to possess is disputed. But it
will not always be so.
Cases of theft, conversion and destruction are not exceptional
07
simply because in those cases the party using self-help is in the fight.'
The question here is whether the policy reasons for refusing the creditor
the right to use self-help rise to the level of a constitutional restriction,
assuming in the first instance that the creditor is otherwise entitled to
take possession of the property. The fact that it has not been deemed
unconstitutional for the states to allow self-help in cases of theft is at
least instructive. Allowing self-help in such cases will lead in a number
of instances to unnecessary violence and intrusion when the party seeking possession is mistaken about his right and meets resistance. Strict
liability for such a mistake cannot ensure that there will be none.
Whatever might be the best policy for regulating self-help wresting
away of physical possession, the type of possession which repossession is
concerned with is legal, not physical. 10 8 At the time the creditor repossesses, the debtor usually is not grasping his car or his washing machine.
The item may be located on real property which the debtor also possesses, or on property over which the debtor has no legal control. 0 9 What
has been said about self-help repossession of items held physically applies
a fortioriwhen possession of the items is a legal construct. Whatever the
danger of violence, destruction and intrusion present in repossession of
items not in someone's physical grasp, it does not usually exceed the
danger present when the item is grasped.
The position against all private physical interference is simply far
too broad. It is true that requiring the state to monopolize repossession
would reduce the chance of violence. It is also true that it would reduce
the number and scope of intrusions upon the privacy of the one in
107. The law is generally that a party must have the right to possess in order to

use self-help, and not merely a good-faith belief that he has such a right. See W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 83-84 (4th ed. 1971). In other words, self-help to obtain possession is a strict liability activity.
108. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
109. But many decisions restrict the extent to which the repossessing creditor can
come onto the debtor's real property. See Brodsky, Constitutionali., of Self-help Repossession under the Uniform Commercial Code: The Eighth and Ninth Circuits Speak,

19 S.D.L. Rnv. 295, 302-5 (1974).
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possession. But laws generally allow for a good deal of self-help in other
situations where the intrusion is the same and violence perhaps just as
likely. For example, an apparent victim of a theft using self-help, like a
creditor, may be mistaken about his rights, and the thief or apparent
thief from whom he seeks to obtain physical possession may be more
likely than a typical debtor to resort to violence. Although the case for
self-help in the creditor-debtor area is perhaps not as compelling as the
case for it where theft or destruction of property appears to be imminent, there is a case for it. Officials cannot always be present to take
custody of property to preserve it from theft, destruction, waste or other
misuse whenever there is a dispute over who has the right to possess it.
There is nothing in the brute facts from which one may conclude that
the debtor is in possession which would make repossession by a creditor
unreasonable, as long as done in a manner that minimizes the chances of
violence and great intrusion. Merely because the state declares that such
facts constitute legal possession by the debtor does not make creditor
repossession unreasonable, for the same state also declares that the
debtor's right to continue in possession is subordinate to the creditor's
right to repossess. Some self-help repossession might be unreasonable if
the state allowed the debtor to do certain things by virtue of his
possession which in turn forced the creditor to take unreasonable steps
to repossess. 10° For that reason I do not endorse any particular package
of debtor rights to do things which frustrate repossessing creditors and
creditor rights to repossess in the face of such frustrating activities; nor
do I endorse U.C.C section 9-503, which may be unreasonable in the
context of other state laws. But I cannot rule out a priori any form of
self-help repossession on the ground that it involves private interference
with "possession."
Conclusion
The Mitchell case seemed to indicate that the Supreme Court was
weighing the proper factors where repossession was state-assisted and
110. "Even when repossession is called for, repossession by a private agent is likely
to result in a greater affront to the debtor's privacy interest. The reason for this lies
in the private repossessors reliance on stealth to avoid detection for, if he is detected
he must either desist or be guilty of a breach of peace. (Footnote omitted.) The difficulty is two-fold: first, the unwarned debtor will be unaware of his exposure and unable
to take precautions to protect his privacy; second, the repossessor may increase the scope
of his intrusion in order to avoid detection. The typical situation is that of the debtor
who awakes to find his car missing-along with many of his personal belongings or papers which were contained in the car. (Footnote omitted.)" Yudof, supra note 60, at
979-80.
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rejecting the much more absolutist approach of Fuentes. However, DiChem greatly constricted the significance of Mitchell in the area of stateassisted or initiated repossessions. At the same time the Court's denial of
certiorariin Adams v. Southern California FirstNational Bank and its
approach to state action in Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co. indicate
that self-help repossession like that authorized by U.C.C. section 9-503
will go unscrutinized, even where it is less protective of the debtor than
state-assisted repossession of the type in Fuentes. Although, as I have
indicated, some self-help repossession may not be unconstitutional, it
certainly is not because of the absence of state action. Once again, an
erroneous conception of the state action requirement has prevented the
Supreme Court from reaching the true constitutional issues involved in a
dispute.

